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This Article illustrates how machine learning (“ML”) can
advance antitrust scholarship through the extraction and
analysis of big data. We have built a ML platform that analyzes
large datasets through topic modeling, an algorithm that maps
the statistical relationships among words. The platform creates
visualizations that illuminate linguistic patterns in antitrust
decisions extracted from Harvard Law Library’s Caselaw
Access Project, which has recently digitized almost all
published decisions in the U.S.
Topic modeling provides new perspectives on how
courts tackle two thorny question in antitrust: the measure of
market power and the balance between antitrust and
regulation. Our visualizations depict how thousands of
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antitrust cases cluster around specific terms—as well as how
these clusters have evolved over time. We present these
visualizations as a new suite of tools to assess the weighty
policy arguments that currently dominate antitrust.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Is legal scholarship driven mainly by ideas or by tools?1
Decades ago, empirical methods revolutionized legal research,
eventually gaining widespread acceptability despite concerns
about experimental design.2 More recently, scholars and judges
have begun adopting the methods of corpus linguistics, which
map word frequency and collocation, to discern the ordinary
meaning of phrases in a statute or the Constitution.3 These
techniques are among the advances of computational legal
analysis (“CLA”), which unleashes quantitative empirical
techniques such as machine learning and natural language
processing upon legal texts.4
The newest tool to gain a following in CLA is topic
modeling, a form of natural language processing that depicts
the probability distribution of terms over a corpus of texts.5
Heralded for its propensity to analyze large, unstructured
datasets, topic modeling has already illuminated patterns in
judicial opinions,6 loan agreements,7 and national

On the origin of this question in science, see Freeman J. Dyson, Is Science
Mostly Driven by Ideas or by Tools?, 338 SCIENCE 1426 (2012).
2 See Daniel E. Ho & Larry Kramer, The Empirical Revolution in Law, 65 STAN.
L. REV. 1195 (2013). See also Joshua Angrist & Jörn-Steffen Pischke, The
Credibility Revolution in Empirical Economics: How Better Research Design is
Taking the Con out of Econometrics, 24 J. ECON. PERSP. 3 (2010).
3 Corpus linguistics studies language through its usage within a body of
texts. TONY MCENRY & ANDREW WILSON, CORPUS LINGUISTICS 1 (2001). For
examples of its application in legal scholarship, see Stefan Th. Gries & Brian
G. Slocum, Ordinary Meaning and Corpus Linguistics, 2017 BYU L. REV. 1417;
Thomas R. Lee & Stephen C. Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning, 127 YALE
L.J. 788 (2018).
4 Michael A. Livermore & Daniel N. Rockmore, Introduction: From Analogue
to Digital Legal Scholarship, in LAW AS DATA: COMPUTATION, TEXT, & THE
FUTURE OF LEGAL ANALYSIS xvii (Michael A. Livermore & Daniel N.
Rockmore eds., 2019).
5 See Michael A. Livermore et al., The Supreme Court and the Judicial Genre, 59
Ariz. L. Rev. 837, 841–42 (2017); David M. Blei et al., Latent Dirichlet
allocation,3 J. MACHINE LEARNING RES. 993 (2003).
6 See id.
7 Bernhard Ganglmair & Malcolm Wardlaw, Complexity, Standardization,
and the Design of Loan Agreements (2017), available at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2952567
1

9/29/2020 9:03 AM

DRAFT

2020]

MINING THE CAP

3

constitutions.8 Yet the tool has not drawn the level of scrutiny
of previous empirical methods. To date, topic modeling
enthusiasts in law have sidestepped basic questions such as (i)
how do disembodied terms, whatever their interrelation,
represent legal doctrine and (ii) should legal texts be spliced
and read in this way?9
A reflexive embrace of topic modeling and, more
generally, CLA risks giving machine learning too quick a pass,10
without vetting the underlying algorithms.11 Word frequencies
“without regard to position, syntax, content, and semantics”
should not comprise the basis for bold claims.12 Unmoored,
CLA resembles what the philosopher Richard Rorty
characterized of certain kinds of literary criticism as “imposing
a vocabulary . . . a ‘grid’ . . . on the text which may have nothing
to do with any vocabulary used in the text or by its author, and
seeing what happens.”13
We aim to correct the oversight by engaging with
critiques of machine learning from areas outside law. For topic
modeling in particular, although its sheen is still fresh in legal
circles, the technique has circulated for years in digital
humanities (“DH”), the branch of traditional humanities that
incorporates machine-driven computation into its analysis.14
DH is a collaborative endeavor at its core, so when legal
scholars borrow its tools without considering assessments of
See David S. Law, Constitutional Archetypes, 95 TEX. L. REV. 153 (2016).
Exceptions include Stanley Fish, If You Count It, They Will Come, 12 N.Y.U.
J. L. & LIBERTY 333 (2019); Michael A. Livermore & Daniel N. Rockmore,
Distant Reading the Law, in LAW AS DATA, supra note 4.
10 For an explanation of machine learning, see Ryan Copus et al., Credible
Prediction: Big Data, Machine Learning and the Credibility Revolution, in LAW AS
DATA, supra note 4 (“Machine learning is not a specific research tool; it is a
catch-all term that refers to any method that features learning by a machine
about quantitative data.”).
11 An algorithm is a set of instructions to perform a task, given a specific
input.
12 Nan Z. Da, The Computational Case against Computational Literary Studies, 45
CRIT. INQUIRY 601 (2019).
13 RICHARD RORTY, CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM 151 (1982).
14 See ANNE BURDICK ET AL., DIGITAL_HUMANITIES 3 (2012); Matthew G.
Kirschenbaum, What Is Digital humanities and What’s It Doing in English
Departments?, 150 ADE BULL. 1 (2010).
8
9
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machine analysis from the humanities and computer science,
we abandon the spirit from which we draw inspiration.
More fundamentally, the technical and computational
abilities of machine learning evolve at a startling pace. If legal
scholars do not slow down now to reflect upon the viability of
the methodologies—or to reset our collaboration with
statisticians, humanists, and computer scientists—then the
likelihood of confronting essential questions grows ever
distant.
Rather than merely reciting the diverse critiques of CLA,
we incorporate them to improve machine learning algorithms
for legal research. We have built a machine learning platform
that analyzes large datasets through variations on topic
modeling. In the most novel variation, we aggregate—or
embed—six levels of topic modeling into a single set of
visualizations. Using aggregated modeling, the platform
reveals linguistic patterns within a corpus of cases extracted
from Harvard Law School’s Caselaw Access Project, which has
recently digitized almost all published decisions in the U.S.15
Through our modifications, topic modeling can create
metadata, similar to the headnotes of commercial legal
databases, that make legal research more efficient. Our central
contribution to the growing field of CLA is to take analysis from
the level of words and phrases to the level of topics and
documents, providing greater contextualization. The ensuing
visualizations, apart from their immense beauty, translate topic
modeling into intuitive models that law scholars can interpret
without statistical or empirical training.
We are mindful that our solution to flawed machine
learning is more machine learning—or at least better machine
learning. Yet virtually all criticisms of algorithmic data
extraction and processing can be distilled to one theme: the

See About, CASELAW ACCESS PROJECT, https://case.law/about/ (last
accessed July 29, 2019).
15
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need to provide greater contextualization.16 In response, we
have not abandoned DH methods but sought to improve them.
As a test, we have compiled a large pool of federal
antitrust cases to see what our algorithms reveal of two thorny
doctrinal questions: the measure of market power and the
balance between antitrust and regulation. Our platform’s
visualizations depict how thousands of market power and
antitrust–regulation cases cluster around different terms—as
well as how these clusters have evolved over time. We have
chosen to start with market power and the antitrust–regulation
balance because doctrinal ambiguities leave interpretation in
these areas wide open, thereby broadening the terms that courts
engage.
Because our platform’s analysis of antitrust cases occurs
through machines, it is bound by neither legal precedent nor
economic theory. Thus, our project addresses not the normative
question of how should courts gauge market power but the
empirical question of how do courts gauge market power. While
algorithmic processing has its limits,17 machine-generated
visualizations can provide a fresh take on thousands of cases.18
Concomitantly, legal doctrines around market power and the
antitrust–regulation balance serve as a back-end check on the
precision of aggregated modeling.

See, e.g. Evan C. Zoldan, Corpus Linguistics and the Dream of Objectivity, 50
SETON HALL L. REV. 401, 406 (2019) (“Rather than simply serving as another
“tool in the toolbox” of statutory interpretation, corpus linguistics is
different from traditional tools of statutory interpretation because it leads to
interpretations that are radically acontextual.”); Da, supra note 12.
17 See SAFIYA UMOJA NOBLE, ALGORITHMS OF OPPRESSION: HOW SEARCH
ENGINES REINFORCE RACISM (2018); Nathan Newman, How Big Data Enables
Economic Harm to Consumers, Especially to Low-Income and Other Vulnerable
Sectors of the Population, 18 J. INTERNET L. 11 (2014).
18 See Law, supra note 6, at 164–65 (“Topic modeling is well suited to the
analysis of large numbers of complex, varied documents . . . because it is
capable of identifying verbal patterns and substantive topics in raw text
without any need for time-consuming and potentially erroneous handcoding of the text”); Elliott Ash & Daniel L. Chen, Case Vectors: Spatial
Representations of the Law Using Document Embeddings, in LAW AS DATA, supra
note 4, at 314 (“[Topic modeling] algorithms have provided a window to the
relations between documents at scale.”).
16
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Our second contribution is to antitrust itself, which is
also at an inflection point in the oscillation between ideas and
tools. More than any time since the rise of the Chicago school,
antitrust today is dominated by ideas. From the new Brandeis
school (sometimes dismissed as “hipster antitrust”)19 to the
multisided platform debate,20 weighty ideas on inequality and
big tech are driving the conversations in antitrust.21 Often, these
conversations unfold without a rigorous methodology to
quantify their claims. We see in topic modeling a new suite of
tools to hone the doctrinal and policy arguments, just as the
Harvard school of antitrust refined the Chicago school’s brash
theoretical pronouncements decades ago.22
Aggregated modeling excels in presenting high-level
summaries of caselaw. For instance, market power cases
splinter into a few large categories: patent cases, health care
cases, telecommunications cases, tying cases, banking and
financial cases, and cases delving deeply into civil and
evidentiary procedure.23 Similarly, from the antitrust–
regulation corpus, we see that cases pertaining to the Interstate
Commerce Commission were supplanted over time by
telecommunications cases, a pattern consistent with
deregulation.24 Doctrinally, these inferences are not necessarily
novel, but they do confirm the conjectures of other antitrust

See Maurice E. Stucke & Ariel Ezrachi, The Rise, Fall, and Rebirth of the U.S.
Antitrust Movement, HARV. BUS. REV. (Dec. 15, 2017); Lina Khan & Sandeep
Vaheesan, Market Power and Inequality: The Antitrust Counterrevolution and Its
Discontents, 11 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 235 (2017).
20 See DAVID S. EVANS & RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, MATCHMAKERS: THE NEW
ECONOMICS OF MULTISIDED PLATFORMS (2016).
21 See Elizabeth Warren, Here’s How We Can Break Up Big Tech, MEDIUM, Mar.
8, 2019; Corporate Accountability an Democracy, BERNIE SANDERS,
https://berniesanders.com/issues/corporate-accountability-anddemocracy/; TIM WU, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: ANTITRUST IN THE NEW GILDED
AGE (2018).
22 See William E. Kovacic, The Intellectual DNA of Modern U.S. Competition Law
for Dominant Firm Conduct: The Chicago/Harvard Double Helix, 2007 COLUM.
BUS. L. REV. 1.
23 See infra Section IV.
24 Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of
Regulated Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1330-34 (1998).
19
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scholars who had theorized from narrower samplings of
caselaw.25
Our results are more provocative, however, for what
they suggest about caselaw research. Currently, scholars and
practitioners rely heavily on proprietary databases such as
Westlaw and Lexis to identify the most relevant cases for a
research question. A search in Westlaw for federal cases bearing
the terms “antitrust” and “market power,’” for example, yields
top results that include Eastman Kodak,26 Jefferson Parish,27
Grinnell,28 Microsoft,29 and du Pont,30 all of them classic cases on
market power.31 Curiously, however, these classic cases do not
tend to show up in our visualizations, whether as top terms or
as top cases within a topic.32 By contrast, the top (or most
relevant) cases identified by topic modeling are not prioritized
by Westlaw or Lexis, but they are influential nonetheless among
practitioner circles within a particular circuit.33
These results question how Westlaw and Lexis execute
their searches, a process that is notoriously opaque.34 For
example, how do the commercial databases differ from widely
accepted statistical algorithms in defining what constitutes
relevant caselaw? In publicizing our algorithms, we hope to
nudge the commercial databases toward greater transparency.

Narrower sampling is often a feature of qualitative research, and doctrinal
research is often qualitative.
26 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
27 Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1994).
28 U.S. v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
29 U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
30 U. S. v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
31 The other cases in the top 11 were In re Copper Market Antitrust Litig., 200
F.R.D. 213 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (which did not even include the term “market
power” or consider the concept), Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Inc.,
Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006), In re Aggrenox Antitrust Litig., 199 F. Supp. 3d 662 (D.
Conn. 2016), Sentry Data Systems, Inc. v. CVS Health, 379 F. Supp. 3d 1320
(S.D. Fla. 2019), Datel Holdings Ltd. v. Microsoft Corp., 712 F. Supp. 2d 974
(N.D. Cal. 2010), and Rebel Oil Co., Inc. v. Auto Flite Oil Co., Inc., 51 F.3d 1421
(9th Cir. 1995). The search was performed on Mar. 20, 2020.
32 The only exception being Microsoft, 253 F.3d.
33 See infra Section IV.
34 See Susan Nevelow Mart, The Algorithm As a Human Artifact: Implications
for Legal [Re]Search, 109 LAW LIBR. J. 387, 389 (2017).
25
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Finally, the source of our data, the Caselaw Access
Project, portends a sea change in information retrieval. In recent
years, freely available legal repositories have debuted,
promising to democratize legal research. Nonetheless, technical
and financial barriers to data extraction and analysis persist.
Insurgent challengers to Westlaw and Lexis are pledging to
harness innovations in information technology to deliver
“faster and smarter” legal research.35 Yet it is not clear whether
these gatekeepers also intend for research to be cost-effective,
especially for academic and nonprofit communities.
We see our project as a leap in algorithmic topic
modeling for legal research, especially as a complement to
commercial databases. Ultimately, we hope that our project will
prompt other collaborations between DH and law, while
pressing information technology insurgents to keep legal
research open and cost-effective.
The remainder of this Article unfolds as follows: Section
II canvases critiques of CLA methods and tinkers with
improvements to topic modeling. Section III introduces our
platform and summarizes our methodology. Section IV
presents preliminary findings and draws inferences that both
affirm and complicate previous antitrust research. Section V
hazards predictions for the way forward. Section VI concludes.
II. TOPIC MODELING LEGAL TEXTS IN THE ERA OF BIG DATA
Machine learning abounds in finance, policing,
employment, politics, and health services,36 but as a research
technique, it is just gaining traction in legal academia. 37 Law
What is Fastcase?, FASTCASE, https://www.fastcase.com/about/ (last
accessed
Feb. 3, 2020).
36 See, e.g., VIRGINIA EUBANKS, AUTOMATING INEQUALITY HOW HIGH TECH
TOOLS PROFILE POLICE & PUNISH THE POOR (2018).
37 One exception is the application of corpus linguistics to statutory
interpretation to discern the ordinary meaning of language. See, e.g., Stefan
Th. Gries & Brian G. Slocum, Ordinary Meaning and Corpus Linguistics, 2017
B.Y.U. L. REV. 1417. Recently, BigML also started to provide machine
35
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scholars are quick to castigate the use of machine learning and,
more broadly, artificial intelligence in law—yet slow to employ
them in legal research. This is an odd conundrum. After all, in
our era of big data, data is king.38 And in law, no data is bigger
than legal texts. Applied to a corpus of case law, machines can
uncover explicit and latent linguistic and semantic patterns,
bringing out significant word clusters “that the eye cannot
see.”39 The proliferation of free, open-source legal databases
and the explosion in data processing capabilities makes our era
a truly exciting one for legal research.
Nonetheless, these technical advances do little to address
the reservations that legal scholars harbor toward CLA. The
tools of corpus linguistics, or instance, have come under
scrutiny for their tendency to decontextualize settings.40 These
are variations of DH practices known as “deformance” and
“tampering” at their most extreme, rearranging texts in the
fashion of what post-structuralists call “a new cut.”41
This Section offers topic modeling as a viable tool for
legal research. In many ways more nuanced than word
frequency and collocation, topic modeling is beginning to gain
traction within CLA, so it is not wholly unfamiliar to law
scholars. Yet the technique has certain vulnerabilities, as digital
humanists and computer scientists have previously pointed
out. This Section therefore reintroduces topic modeling,
especially in triangulation with corpus linguistics and other
empirical methods, which are more familiar. It also summarizes
the criticisms of topic modeling, as a preview to our
improvements to traditional topic modeling algorithms.
learning services to academics. See BigML, https://bigml.com/ (last
accessed Jan. 15, 2020).
38 For a definition of big data, see Svetlana Sicular, Gartner's Big Data
Definition Consists of Three Parts, Not to Be Confused with Three “V”s, FORBES
(Mar.
27,
2013,
8:00
AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/gartnergroup/2013/03/27/gartners-bigdata-definition-consists-of-three-parts-not-to-be-confused-with-three-vs/.
39 Lauren Klein, Distant Reading after Moretti, https://lklein.com/digitalhumanities/distant-reading-after-moretti/ (Jan. 10, 2018).
40 See, e.g., Carissa Byrne Hessick, Corpus Linguistics and the Criminal Law,
2017 BYU L. REV. 1503 (2017); Zoldan, supra note 16.
41 Fish, supra note 9, at 303–04.
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A. A Primer on Topic Modeling
Topic modeling illustrates the probable distribution of
terms and their co-occurrence within a dataset, a process that
uncovers latent, or hidden, patterns within the dataset.42 These
patterns are presented as “topics,” where each topic is
comprised of the terms most likely to appear together.43 Topic
modeling builds upon the general concept of modeling, which
creates representations of data patterns in a statistically or
logically coherent form.44 While models abound in legal
research, topic modeling is performed through machine
learning to amplify processing power.45 The tool enables
researchers to analyze tomes of data without having to
manually code them first, as is custom in traditional empirical
methods.46
Topic modeling is particularly useful in text-intensive
projects because of its propensity to uncover language patterns.
For instance, researchers in one discipline—say, statistics—may
cite influential papers within their discipline but miss relevant
papers in another discipline—e.g., economics or biology.47 If
topic modeling is run on papers from statistics, economics, and
biology, it can cut through citation biases to identify the terms
and topics common to all three fields, resulting in more useful
literature recommendations.
The pervading topic modeling algorithm is latent
Dirichlet allocation (“LDA”), which reveals the Dirichlet
See Jason Chuang et al., Interpretation and Trust: Designing Model-Driven
Visualizations for Text Analysis, in CHI ’12: PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIGCHI
CONFERENCE ON HUMAN FACTORS IN COMPUTING SYSTEMS (2012).
43 Chong Wang & David M. Blei, Collaborative Topic Modeling for
Recommending Scientific Articles, in KDD ’11: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 17TH ACM
SIGKDD INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON KNOWLEDGE DISCOVERY AND
DATA MINING (2011).
44 See KEVIN D. ASHLEY, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LEGAL ANALYTICS:
NEW TOOLS FOR LAW PRACTICE IN THE DIGITAL AGE 234–35 (2017).
4545 See id. at 77 (case-based legal reasoning models), 131 (legal argument
models), 234 (machine learning models).
46 Livermore et al., supra note 5, at 842.
47 See Wang & Blei, supra note 43.
42
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allocation, or multivariable probability distributions, of topics
over a fixed vocabulary within a dataset.48 True to form, LDA
was deployed early on in projects such as the Stanford
Dissertation Browser, an interactive tool that shows the
commonalities across dissertations written at Stanford from
1993 to 2008, and an algorithm to recommend scientific articles
to researchers.49
Two features of topic modeling—its ability to sift
through large volumes of texts and to uncover hidden
connections within those texts—makes it tantalizing for legal
research. While the tool remains new to law scholars,50 a
growing number of researchers are adopting it for projects on
loan agreements,51 constitutions around the world,52 Supreme
Court legal opinions,53 and control rights in union contracts.54
While not wholly analogous to topic modeling, corpus
linguistics is in some ways an apt comparator for its trajectory
from linguistics into law. Corpus linguistics takes an empirical
approach to the study of language by gauging ordinary
meaning through the usage of words and phrases in a corpus,
or body, of natural language texts.55 Its advocates in law,
including most prominently Justice Thomas Lee on the Utah
Supreme Court, argue that its methods can elucidate ordinary

See Blei et al., supra note 5.
See An Experiment in Document Exploration, STANFORD DISSERTATION
BROWER, https://nlp.stanford.edu/projects/dissertations/ (last accessed
Feb. 2, 2020); Chuang et al., supra note 42; Wang & Blei, supra note 43.
50 In 2016, David Law identified only two instances of topic modeling in legal
research. See Law, supra note 6, at n.31.
51 Bernhard Ganglmair & Malcolm Wardlaw, Complexity, Standardization,
and the Design of Loan Agreements (2017), available at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2952567.
52 Law, supra note 6.
53 Greg Leibon et al., Bending the Law: Geometric Tools for Quantifying
Influence in the Multinetwork of Legal Opinions, 26 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE &
L. 145 (2018); Livermore et al., supra note 5.
54 Elliott Ash et al., The Language of Contract: Promises and Power in Union
Collective
Bargaining
Agreements
(2019),
available
at
https://extranet.sioe.org/uploads/sioe2019/ash_macleod_naidu.pdf.
55 For a concise summary with direct applicability to law, see Lee &
Mouritsen, supra note 3, at 828–80. See also MCENRY & WILSON, supra note 3,
at 1.
48
49
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meaning of words and phrases in statutory interpretation.56
Among law schools, Brigham Young University has invested
most heavily in the marriage of corpus linguistics and law,
building out two corpora of texts—a database of 5.2 billion
words from web-based newspapers and magazines since 2010
and a historical database of over 400 million words from the
1810s to the 2000s—that formed the basis for some of Justice
Lee’s work.57 Researchers can perform functions that count
word frequency, identify other words located in close
proximity, and display concordance—or a key word in the
context of its surroundings. These capabilities help piece
together the ordinary meaning and semantic contexts of key
words. This approach has caught on as a new form of empirical
analysis, possibly even hewing close to originalism.58
Understandably, corpus linguistics has provoked
denunciation. Legal scholars have decried as “radically
acontextual” the separation of statutory language “from its
distinctly legal context.”59 Word frequency and collocation
crowdsource for meaning by scanning random corpora of
natural language, including sources of dubious judicial value
such as Urban Dictionary.60 All in all, as critics point out, the
faith of corpus linguistics adherents in technique seems to derive
from a mistrust of judicial discretion, as if word frequency
conveys a more objective, verifiable truth than the intuition of
judges.61 In countering that judges may be more accountable for
their decisions than machine learning technocrats,62 critics echo
a broader skepticism of artificial intelligence as an unelected,
See, e.g., Thomas R. Lee & James C. Phillips, Data-Driven Originalism, 167
U. PA. L. REV. 261 (2019); Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 3.
57 See NOW Corpus (News on the Web), BYU, http://corpus.byu.edu/now
[http://perma.cc/UTD2-BC86].
58 See Law & Corpus Linguistics, BYU Law, https://lawcorpus.byu.edu/ (last
accessed Feb. 13, 2020). Other recent examples of its application include
Jennifer Mascott, Who Are “Officers of the United States”?, 70 STAN. L. REV.
443, 564 (2018); Josh Blackman and James C. Phillips, Corpus Linguistics and
the Second Amendment (Harvard Law Review Blog, Aug. 7, 2018).
59 Zoldan, supra note 16, at 447.
60 Id. at 417.
61 See Hessick, supra note 40, at 1512.
62 See id. at 1516–17.
56
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unaccountable decision-maker that is incapable of empathy.63
For these scholars, corpus linguistics may offer an impartiality
that is too simply elusive to stand in place human analysis and
judgment.
We can reach even further back to find a comparable
antecedent for topic modeling in empirical legal studies
(“ELS”), which approaches law through empirical methods.64
ELS has a rich history,65 one that cannot be adequately
summarized here, but in the course of that history, it has had to
contend with two criticisms that are relevant to the rise of topic
modeling. The first is that empirical research has suffered a
“credibility revolution” in its use of observed data to make
causal inferences.66 Starting in economics, this revolution forced
empirical researchers in all fields to root out bias through better
research design.67 Related to this point about rigor is a second
critique—that ELS lacks a theoretical framework. This charge
manifests as different variations: that ELS scholarship is too
data-driven,68 that it fetishizes technique at the expense of the
bigger picture.69
Topic modeling, of course, is distinct from both the
techniques of corpus linguistics and the approach of ELS. When
legal texts are taken as the datasource, topic modeling avoids
the corpus linguistics pitfall of looking to irrelevant sources.
Corpus linguistics, by contrast, is usually deployed in the hunt
for ordinary meaning as part of statutory interpretation, which
See Kiel Brennan-Marquez & Stephen E. Henderson, Artificial Intelligence
and Role Reversible Judgment, 109 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOL. 137 (2019).
64 For a more fundamental summary of empirical legal studies, see Theodore
Eisenberg, The Origins, Nature, and Promise of Empirical Legal Studies and a
Response to Concerns, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1713, 1720 (“a core principle [of
empirical legal studies] seems indisputable: it is better to have more
systematic knowledge of how the legal system works rather than less,
regardless of the normative implications of that knowledge”).
65 See, e.g., id.; Ho & Kramer, supra note 2.
66 Copus, supra note 8, at 21.
67 Angrist & Pischke, supra note 2; Copus, supra note 8, at 21.
68 Eisenberg, supra note 64, at 1732–33.
69 Brian Leiter, On So-Called “Empirical Legal Studies” and Its Problems, BRIAN
LEITER’S
L.
SCH.
REP.
(July
6,
2010,
6:41
AM),
http://leiterlawschool.typepad.com/leiter/2010/07/on-socalledempirical-legal-studies.html.
63
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justifies departing from legal texts.70 The analogy to ELS also
breaks down if topic modeling is not being used for predictive
purposes. After all, topic modeling was invented by computer
scientists as an information retrieval mechanism, even though
it has since been adopted as a predictive mechanism.71 We, too,
employ topic modeling to gather information and verify
doctrinal claims rather than make predictions. Functionally, our
use of the tool diverges with one of the primary goals of ELS
and the subject of its denigration.72
Nonetheless, topic modeling is still vulnerable to the
same reproach of overreliance on disembodied words that
plagues corpus linguistics.73 More specifically, how can we
account for context in performing statistical analysis
(fundamentally a quantitative endeavor)? We anticipate
questions from ELS as well. How can we ensure that topic
modeling does not merely dazzle with its technical prowess but
shows us something significant? Put differently, why should
we care about these results? And if the method is so important,
what steps have we taken to guarantee its rigor?
These questions will be answered in turn in the
following sections.
B.

Criticisms from Digital Humanities and Computer Science

In theory, topic modeling illuminates patterns that
cannot be seen by the human eye, at least not with traditional
close readings of text. It is a form of distant reading, which
considers texts “from afar, using statistics to support large-scale
claims.”74 While distant reading appears to belie the close
textual analysis that underpins legal research, especially
qualitative doctrinal research, the reality is that law scholars
For a summary of this hunt for ordinary meaning, see Lee & Mouritsen,
supra note 3, at 796–800.
71 See Benjamin M. Schmidt, Words Alone: Dismantling Topic Models in the
Humanities, 2 J. DIGITAL HUM. 49 (2012).
72 See Copus, supra note 8.
73 See Da, supra note 12.
74 Michael A. Livermore & Daniel N. Rockmore, Distant Reading and the Law,
in LAW AS DATA, supra note 4, at 4. See also Klein, supra note 36.
70
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have implemented the quantitative methods of social sciences
for decades, and CLA methods are merely the latest
development. Distant reading can spur interesting
collaborations on legal research, particularly in formulating the
type of systematic review that can vet the claims of doctrinal
work.75
DH and computer science, however, have lived with
topic modeling far longer; there, criticisms of the tool are welldeveloped. Detractors of the computational approach to
reading charge that it is “prone to fallacious overclaims or
misinterpretations of statistical results because it often places
itself in a position of making claims based purely on word
frequencies without regard to position, syntax, context, and
semantics.”76 More pointedly, the excitement around topic
modeling merely stems from the fact that it seems to work
better than other “rearrangement algorithms”; without the
proper supervision, the tool resembles a “bad research
assistant” that produces inexplicable and misleading results as
much as “flickers of deeper truths.”77
Context is therefore central to the viability of topic
modeling. Robust visualizations must be able to show the texts
from which the words are drawn—or, with legal texts, the cases
that are statistically most likely to be comprised of the words
that constitute a topic. Relatedly, it is possible to focus too much
on a few discrete topics and lose the forest for the trees, so topics
must be surveyed as a whole rather than in isolation.78 The
opposite is also true: topic modeling can overwhelm users as
much by the grandness of its topics (i.e., too many topics) as by
the exquisiteness of its detail (i.e., too many terms within a
topic). To borrow from Gulliver’s Travels, the eighteenth century
satire at the outset of the Enlightenment’s scientific discoveries,
See id. at 16; William Baude et al., Making Doctrinal Work More Rigorous:
Lessons from Systematic Reviews, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 37 (2017).
76 Da, supra note 12, at 611.
77 Schmidt, supra note 71.
78 Andrew Goldstone & Ted Underwood, What Can Topic Models of PMLA
Teach Us About the History of Literary Scholarship?, 2 J. DIG. HUM. (2012),
http://journalofdigitalhumanities.org/2-1/what-can-topic-models-ofpmla-teach-us-by-ted-underwood-and-andrew-goldstone/.
75
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topic modeling creates both a gargantuan world and a
miniscule world, and the user may be adrift at both extremes.79
For this reason, a topic modeling interface must simultaneously
be able to break topics down to their constituent words and
aggregate them into networks.80 We respond to these critiques
by building visualizations that can do both, as presented in the
next Subsection.
Contextual shifts can also come from words themselves.
Over time, for instance, usage evolves; spellings change,
registers shift, and terms assume ironic connotations.81 Topics
must capture all the dynamic ranges of a word to be
comprehensive. To cite a more specific example from antitrust,
the prevailing paradigm of market power is first to define the
relevant product and geographic markets and then to calculate
the market shares of the defendant within those markets.82 Our
algorithms capture several topics where the term “relevant” is
featured prominently. As a robustness check, we review the
cases within those topics to ensure that “relevant” refers to
market definition rather than the relevance of a legal or factual
argument.83
Beyond decontextualization, DH and computer science
identify other deficiencies of topic modeling. Some of them are
relevant to legal scholarship and can be addressed; others may
be relevant but cannot be programmed around. In the first
camp is the argument that the computer scientists who created
LDA intended topic modeling to perform functions quite
different than what DH scholars have made them do.84 David
See JONATHAN SWIFT, GULLIVER’S TRAVELS (1726).
See Schmidt, supra note 71.
8181 See, e.g., id. (“In any 150-year topic model, for example, the spelling of
“any one” will change to “anyone,” “sneaked” to “snuck”, and so forth. The
model is going to have to account for those changes somehow, either by
simply forcing all topics to occupy narrow bands of time, or by assuming
that the vocabulary of (say) chemistry did not change from 1930 to 1980.”).
82 See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF
COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE § 6.4 (5th ed. 2011).
83 See infra Section IV.
84 Schmidt, supra note 71 (“New ways of reading the composition of topics
are necessary, because humanists seem to want to do slightly different things
79
80
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Blei, one of the pioneers of LDA, had envisioned topic modeling
as an information retrieval algorithm that made “large
collections of text browsable by giving useful tags to the
documents,” a function similar to Westlaw’s insertion of
headnotes.85 Precursors of LDA, including most prominently
latent semantic analysis from the 1990s, were designed for
information retrieval and indexing as well.86 However enticing
it may be to harness topic modeling and other CLA techniques
for prediction of, say, litigation outcomes, these tools might be
better restricted to discrete retrieval, indexing, and archival
functions in law, at least until legal scholars have a better grasp
of their capabilities.87 Those functions, as we shall argue later,
include tagging caselaw with helpful metadata to enable more
efficient browsing, rather than to make predictions about how
a case might come out.
When empirical techniques are used for prediction, they
draw scrutiny instantly. CLA methods are no different.88 Yet
even if topic modeling is not used to forecast outcomes, it can
fail simple robustness and reproducibility checks. Scholars have
shown that if a corpus of text is changed slightly (e.g., 1% of the
original sample removed), the ensuing topics are entirely
different.89 Similarly, the modeling sampled in prominent DH
papers have not always withstood reproduction by others.90
These methodological concerns question whether topic
modeling is stable and verifiable.

with topic models than the computer scientists who invented them and
know them best.”).
85 Id.
86 See Scott Deerwester et al., Indexing by Latent Semantic Analysis, 41 J. AM.
SOC. INFO. SCI. 391 (1990).
87 To some extent, this inclination is understandable. The predictive
possibilities of text analytics draw grant funding and industry–university
partnerships. For an interesting account at Georgia State University, see
Charlotte S. Alexander, Using Text Analytics to Predict Litigation Outcomes, in
LAW AS DATA, supra note 4.
88 See Copus, supra note 8. For a discussion of how these discussions may
hamper our imagination of what CLA can do, see Allen Riddell, Prediction
Before Inference, in LAW AS DATA, supra note 4.
89 Da, supra note 12, at 628.
90 Id. at 628–29.
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Finally, because humanities scholars have rebuked the
digitization of their field in ways that have some applicability
to legal research. These include institutional and political
economy criticisms that DH replicates a Silicon Valley ethos of
disruption for disruption’s sake while masking a neoliberal
takeover of university research functions.91 Computational
analysis saps institutions of traditional scholarly research and
writing, replacing these functions instead with grantsdependent research labs. Additionally, the corpora from which
documents are extracted and the programmers coding the
algorithms often do not accommodate diverse perspectives.92
These shortcomings are important to bear in mind as CLA
moves forward, even if they are not completely within the
control of law scholars.
C. Aggregated Modeling
We take seriously the criticisms levied at topic modeling
from DH and computer science. Accordingly, we have
constructed a way to aggregate up to six different LDA topic
models in one iteration. In this way, we create “model of
models” that addresses some of the contextualization,
robustness, and reproducibility concerns surrounding the tool.
This Subsection introduces the features of our aggregated
modeling; we believe it still must be paired with other modeling
tools for caselaw research to be comprehensive, and we leave
the next Section to fully describe our methodology. We argue
that the full suite of these topic modeling tools can streamline
caselaw research by adding metadata, comprised of topics and
their constituent terms, to signal relevance to a user’s research
questions. Because topic modeling is still rather novel in law,
we would also restrict them to information retrieval rather than
predictive functions for now.

See Danielle Allington et al., Neoliberal Tools (and Archives): A Political
History of Digital Humanities, LOS ANGELES REV. BOOKS, May 1, 2016.
92 See id.; Klein, supra note 36.
91
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Several improvements to traditional topic models flow
from their aggregation. First, our visualizations place topics in
both large and small contexts.

Figure 1: Network View of Market Power Cases in Model of
Models
Figure 1 shows a network of antitrust market power
cases distributed as topic clusters across space. A topic cluster
is an aggregation of multiple topics, where each topic is a
collection of terms that are statistically most likely to appear
together. The right-hand panel lists each cluster as a distinct
shade of color; the clusters are also numbered. In addition, each
cluster displays the number of topics that comprise the cluster
as well as the top words in the topics. The central graphic
depicts the relationship among the clusters. The left-hand panel
lists the top “documents,” or cases, within a topic as well as the
relevant metadata (e.g., case name). It also enables the retrieval
of cases.
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Figure 2: Close-Up View of Antitrust–Regulation Cases with
Document Retrieval
Figure 2 demonstrates the case retrieval function on a
corpus of antitrust–regulation cases: The highlighted topic
cluster in the center encompasses topics with the terms
“commiss[ion],” “rate,” “carrier,” “power,” and “act,” while the
document retrieval feature enables the user to pull up specific
cases. Here we have chosen to highlight American Trucking
Associations, Inc. v. I.C.C., the top case in the cluster.93 Note the
“top” case means that case that is cross-listed in the most topics.
Our aggregated modeling presents two levels of
information: cluster networks show the connections among the
topics, while the document retrieval interface shows the specific
cases that contribute to each topic. In this way, topics are
contextualized at both the macro- and the microscopic levels.
The two scales of analysis allow us to see the full complexity of
the corpus as a spatial arrangement of how terms are scattered
across the cases that comprise the network.
The visualizations employ vector space modeling, with
topic clusters are strewn across space. In classic vector space
models, such as Google’s Word2Vec, algorithms process the
conceptual relations between words and depict each word as a
93

656 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir. 1981).
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vector, or dimension, in space.94 The angle between two vectors,
or their cosine, portrays the magnitude of difference between
those words. The dimension reduction approach of Word2Vec
aids in interpretability, portraying related words as crowding
together and dissimilar words as far-flung. This intuition, that
related words congregate, informs our visualizations of topic
clusters in the neural network architecture, where topics
congregate.
To bolster model stability, a feature that traditional topic
modeling sometimes lacks,95 our algorithms run topic models
at least twenty times for each query. As with any empirical
project based on copious amounts of data, topic modeling is
subject to margins of error, or “wobble.” As the next Section
details, we run variations of more traditional topic modeling as
comparators for each query. In comparison, model aggregation
reduces the wobble significantly because the process only picks
up the most stable and persistent topics across multiple
iterations.
The frequency of iterations also helps to present topics
more coherently. Insignificant topic clusters are removed on
multiple runs, so the aggregation ensures that visualizations
present larger networks that have picked up truly significant
term repetitions, rather than statistically aberrant patterns.
In the end, we deploy topic modeling not so much for its
predictive ability or even its insight into the meaning of words
in themselves but for its indexing and information retrieval
capabilities. In creating a case retrieval function, we permit
users to pull up the texts which showcase the words of a topic
model in their original context. All the additional information
presented in the visualizations—from network connections to
topic clusters—can be taken as metadata that signal the
relevance of antitrust cases to particular words and topics. This,
See Thomas Mikolov, Distributed Representations of Words and Phrases and
their Compositionality, in ADVANCES IN NEURAL INFORMATION PROCESSING
SYSTEMS 26 (C.J.C. Burges et al. eds., 2013); Elliott Ash & Daniel L. Chen, Case
Vectors: Spatial Representations of the Law Using Document Embeddings, in LAW
AS DATA, supra note 4, at 315–7.
95 See, e.g., Da, supra note 12, at 625.
94
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in effect, is the same functions that subscribers pay lavish fees
to Westlaw and Lexis for. It is, as we shall argue, a necessary
check to the proprietary databases, which are notoriously
opaque about their algorithms.
III.

METHODOLOGY

Big data caselaw research is often hindered by two
primary obstacles. First, only a few repositories hold a corpus
of easily extractable caselaw.96 Second, even if cases could be
easily extracted, their interpretation is limited by modeling that
can translate machine analysis into intuitive visualizations.97
This Section details how we are using recent technical
advances to overcome the hurdles to data extraction and data
interpretation. In October 2018, Harvard Law School unveiled
its Caselaw Access Project (“CAP”), which had digitized all
book-published U.S. case law between 1658 and 2018, some 40
million pages.98 We have created two pools of cases out of the
CAP dataset: 36,000 federal cases bearing the word “antitrust”
and 305,000 federal cases bearing the word “regulation.” We
whittle the first pool down to 2,591 cases with the term “market
power” (the “Market Power Corpus”) and the second pool
down to 7,308 with the term “antitrust” (the “Antitrust–
Regulation Corpus”).
As for data interpretation, we adjust traditional topic
modeling algorithms to generate visualizations of both pools of
cases. We pair our aggregated modeling with open-source topic
modeling algorithms, so the composites reflect the various
dimensions of the corpora. The open-source visualizations are
fairly easy to replicate: they incorporate the work of
programmers and DH scholars who have made the tools freely
The leading commercial databases, Westlaw and Lexis, are not conducive
to high-volume data mining because they require licenses and complicated
APIs. Other platforms, such as the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission’s EDGAR filing system or the U.S. Federal Register, do not hold
cases. Despite the proclivity of law for natural language text mining, easy
access to copious amounts of case law is limited.
97 See Chuang et al., supra note 42.
98 About, CASELAW ACCESS PROJECT, supra note 15.
96
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available.99 While we have selected this suite of topic modeling
algorithms for fit to one another, we have also done so out of
the interests of transparency and reproducibility. Our hope is
that data interpretation will be as open as data extraction.
This Section begins by introducing the CAP. Then it
explains our data and access procedures, before concluding
with our modeling and visualization processes.
A. The Caselaw Access Project
CAP, a partnership among Harvard Law School’s
Library Innovation Lab, its Berkman-Klein Center, and the legal
research company Ravel Law, spent over three years to simply
digitize all court decisions published in the 40,000 bound
volumes in the Harvard Law School Library.100 The resulting
database is the most comprehensive of its kind outside of the
Library of Congress.101 CAP’s cases span some 360 years and all
federal and state courts, as well as territorial courts in American
Samoa, Dakota Territory, Guam, Native American Courts,
Navajo Nation, and the Northern Mariana Islands.102
The great advantage of the CAP dataset is that cases are
provided in a clean, digestible form, so users need not write
application programming interfaces (“APIs”) to pull data. Texts
are presented in machine-readable format, greatly simplifying
big data projects. Cases can be extracted through either APIs or
bulk downloads.103 By contrast, commercial legal databases

See The topic browser visualization is adapted from Andrew Goldstone's
dfr-browser project. See Andrew Goldstone, DFR-Browser: Take a MALLETT
to Disciplinary History, https://agoldst.github.io/dfr-browser/ (last
accessed Feb. 27, 2020); Ben Mabey, Welcome to PyLDAvis’s Documentation,
https://pyldavis.readthedocs.io/en/latest/index.html (last accessed Feb.
27, 2020).
100 See About, supra note 15.
101 Jason Tashea, Caselaw Access Project Gives Free Access to 360 Years of
American Court Cases, ABA J., Oct. 30, 2018.
102 About, supra note 15.
103 Id.; Tashea, supra note 101.
99
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require users to utilize their own APIs to pull large volumes of
cases, as well as the execution of license agreements.104
CAP will disrupt legal research. By making freely
available all published decisions in nearly every U.S.
jurisdiction, it threatens the Westlaw and Lexis paywalls,
greatly expanding legal access for anyone with an Internet
connection. The database is free for the public, though
LexisNexis, which now owns Ravel Law, controls commercial
use.105
Apart from comprehensiveness, CAP is also run on a
versatile interface that has shared stock APIs for software
developers.106 It also includes basic searching, browsing, and
downloading functions, as well as the ability to explore
historical trends in the caselaw.107 Given CAP’s flexibility and
ease of use, law scholars have already begun using it for big
data projects.108
CAP does have limitations. Notably, it excludes cases
published after June 2018 and cases not designated as officially
published, such as some lower court decisions. The scope
restrictions also leave out unpublished trial documents, such as
filings and exhibits. Nonetheless, the corpus is large enough to
compile rich models and graphs.
B.

Data and Access

Data for our project was made available through CAP,
which contains 6.7 million unique cases (and over 1.7 million
federal cases). Having applied for and obtained researcher
access from CAP, we gathered data by writing python-based
104 We

spent close to a year negotiating license agreements with Westlaw and
Lexis and also tinkering with APIs—until CAP went live.
105 Tashea, supra note 101.
106 See id.
107 See Tools, CASELAW ACCESS PROJECT, https://case.law/tools/ (last
accessed Mar. 26, 2020).
108 See, e.g., Jaromir Savelka et al., Improving Sentence Retrieval from Case Law
for Statutory Interpretation, ICAIL (2019); Jonathan H. Choi, An Empirical
Study
of
Statutory
Interpretation
in
Tax
Law
(2019),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3460962.
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calls to its API. CAP’s own APIs feature tools that permit
searching through all text in selected cases (as opposed to
searches using tags or other metadata). We created two pools of
cases: all federal cases with the word “antitrust,” a total of
approximately 36,000 cases; and all federal cases with the word
“regulation,” a total of approximately 305,000 cases. These
serve as the bases for our Market Power Corpus of 2,591 cases
from the “antitrust” pool and our Antitrust–Regulation Corpus
of 7,308 cases from the “regulation” pool.
At first glance, these numbers seemed small to us,
particularly the count of 36,000 for all federal antitrust cases.
However, two limitations help explain the variance: first, CAP
stops in 2018 at Volume 281 of the third series of the Federal
Supplement and Volume 881 of the third series of the Federal
Reporter, omitting approximately two years of recent cases.109
Second, CAP excludes unpublished decisions.
We verified the case counts in the Market Power Corpus
and the Antitrust–Regulation Corpus in several ways. A
Westlaw search and subsequent filter for reported federal cases
with the terms “antitrust and ‘market power’” returned 2,732
cases; for reported federal cases with the terms “antitrust and
regulation,” this number was 9,775. We also utilized CAP’s
historical trends interface for verification. CAP has a little over
1.7 million unique federal cases in its corpus, and a search in
historical trends reveals that antitrust cases have comprised a
low of about 0.1% to a high of almost 4% of all federal cases,
with a median roughly short of 2% (or about 34,000 cases).110
Overall, we have more than a robust sampling for federal
antitrust cases.
Manual assessment quickly becomes impracticable
when examining a corpus as extensive as CAP. Thus, the
application of machine learning provides a more manageable
E-mail from Adam Ziegler, CAP, to F. Chang, on Feb. 10, 2020.
A simple search using CAP’s historical trends function reveals that
antitrust cases rose to a high of 4% of all federal cases in the 1980s. See
Historical Trends, CASELAW ACCESS PROJECT, https://case.law/trends/
(search for “us: antitrust”). We also verified CAP’s count of federal antitrust
cases, which was roughly 32,000.
109
110
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approach. We use LDA as the baseline algorithm to sort
through each case’s natural language and produce models of
topics based on the clustering of frequently recurring words.111
LDA proceeds in two steps: first, the algorithm groups words
that have a high probability of co-occurrence into word clusters,
or topics; then, it identifies the decisions where each topic is
most likely to appear. This computational approach to language
allows us to see certain trends through topics generated from
the case law documents’ own semantic and syntactic structures,
rather than applying human data and metadata structures to a
dataset. Put differently, machine learning has the potential to
provide a neutral way of ordering this volume of case law,
devoid of human—and doctrinal—preconceptions.
C. Modeling and Visualizations
Using Elasticsearch (a full-text search and analytics
engine)112 and the python Gensim package,113 we built a webbased platform. The platform performs topic modeling by using
the unsupervised machine learning clustering algorithm LDA
to sift through cases. LDA models are generated based on the
distribution of latent topics in a document and the distribution
of words in those topics.114 Each topic is constructed based on a
probability distribution of words.115 For instance, one topic
See Blei et al., supra note 5.
Elasticsearch:
The
Heart
of
the
Elastic
Stack,
ELASTIC,
https://www.elastic.co/products/elasticsearch (last accessed Sept. 14,
2019).
113
Gensim
3.8.1,
PYTHON
PACKAGE
INDEX,
https://pypi.org/project/gensim/ (Sept. 26, 2019 data release) (last
accessed Oct. 20, 2019).
114 Blei et al., supra note 5.
115 For a more detailed explanation, see Chuang et al., supra note 42:
111
112

Given as input a desired number of topics K and
a set of documents containing words from a
vocabulary V, LDA derives K topics βk, each a
multinomial distribution over words V. For
example, a “physics” topic may contain with high
probability words such as “optical,” “quantum,”
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might feature the term “market” with high probability, whereas
its association with another topic will not be as strong.
Similarly, one document might have a high presence of topic 1,
pertaining to procedural and evidentiary matters, whereas that
same topic only features faintly in another document. In this
project, we have defined a “document” as an individual case
from our dataset.
As with any empirical project based on copious amounts
of data, term relevance and topic modeling are subject to
margins of error, which we affectionately call the “wobble.” We
have found that the wobble is slight for two of the three types
of visualizations (topic browser and pyLDAvis) and virtually
negligible for the third (aggregated). As discussed in the prior
Section, aggregated modeling minimizes variance by running
any query up to twenty times.
The models provide visualizations of cases grouped by
recurring terms, depicting both the relationships among terms
and the relationships among groups of cases. We rely on three
types of visualizations, all built around topic modeling. In
totality, the visualizations capture the full nuances of the topics.
The remainder of this Subsection explores all three types, using
the Market Power Corpus as the dataset.
The first set of visualizations are generated by our
unique aggregated modeling algorithms. These create
“multilevel” or “model-of-models” visualizations that provide
a hierarchical view of topics and topic clusters in three different
formats—tree, circle, and network (see Figures 3–6).

“frequency,” “laser,” etc. Simultaneously, LDA
recovers the per-document mixture of topics θd
that best describes each document. For example, a
document about using lasers to measure
biological activity might be modeled as a mixture
of words from a “physics” topic and a “biology”
topic.
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Figure 3: Multilevel Visualization of Market Power Cases in
Tree Format
In the tree format of Figure 3, the smaller nodes on the
right represent topics (e.g., machine-grouped terms “price,”
“retail,” “competit[ion],” “market,” and “wholesal[e]”), while
the larger nodes represent clusters of topics (e.g., a cluster with
“price,” “market,” “evid[ence],” “competit[ion],” and
“product”). The size of each cluster node or topic node
represents the significance of the cluster or topic to the overall
corpus. The right-hand bar shows the number of topics within
each cluster (thereby functioning as a proxy for the cluster’s
diversity), and the left-hand bar lists the top cases in each topic.
Circle view presents the same information, but in a
format that more clearly conveys the topics where each word
appears. Clicking on a specific word pulls up how it is shared
across topic clusters. For example, Figure 4 (below) shows the
recurrence of the term “market” within all topics. In contrast,
network view constructs a spatial representation where each
topic comprises a vector in space (see Figure 1 above). It is
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adapted from the neural network architecture Word2Vec,
where each word represents a vector.116

Figure 4: Multilevel Visualization Showing the Recurrence of
the Term “Market”
The second set of visualizations, “topic browser,” are
generated from the DFR framework of Andrew Goldstone, a
DH scholar. Topic browser visualizations organize cases into
topics, enabling detailed analyses of where (i.e., in what topics)
certain terms recur (see Figures 5 and 6).

116

Mikolov, supra note 94.
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Figure 5: Topic Browser Visualization of Market Power Cases
in List Format
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Figure 6: Breakdown of Terms and Cases within a Topic in
Topic Browser View
From the overview in Figure 5, the user can browse a
specific topic by clicking on it, which brings up the topic’s top
terms and cases as shown in Figure 6. Both the overview and
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single-topic view display histograms on the time periods when
certain topics were more prevalent.
Clicking on each term pulls up the topics where the term
appears.117 For instance, Figure 11 (below) shows that “relev”
(as in relevant market, which would come up in market
definition) appears in only three topics—a slightly surprising
result in a corpus of cases dealing with market power.
The third set of visualizations, python-based LDA
visualizations (“pyLDAvis”), is built from the framework of the
programmer Ben Mabey. PyLDAvis depicts the distance
between topics, in a format that most closely resembles the
Word2Vec architecture (see Figure 7).118 Word2Vec is a twolayer neural network devised by Google that assigns each term
onto a vector in space. The totality of such a graph represents
the entire corpus and can have hundreds of vectors, each
corresponding to a term, thereby illustrating the proximity and
distance among terms.119 In the pyLDAvis adaptation, the size
of each topic bubble represents the weight of that topic. When
a topic is highlighted, the platform pulls up the top probable
words contained in that topic.120

The topic browser visualization is adapted from Andrew Goldstone's dfrbrowser project. See Goldstone, supra note 99.
118 pyLDAvis is adapted from package led by Ben Mabey. See Mabey, supra
note 99.
119 See Mikolov, supra note 94. For an illustration of Word2Vec, see Jay
Alammar, The Illustrated Word2Vec, GITHUB, Mar. 29, 2019,
https://jalammar.github.io/illustrated-word2vec/. For a criticism from the
legal perspective, see Levendowski, supra note 124.
120 For a mathematical expression of probability, one of the key concepts in
this statistical analysis, see Carson Sievert & Kenneth E. Shirley, LDA vis: A
Method for Visualizing and Interpreting Topics, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE
WORKSHOP ON INTERACTIVE LANGUAGE LEARNING, VISUALIZATION, AND
INTERFACES 63, 66 (Jason Chuang et al. eds. 2014). The probability of any term
within a topic is its relevance within that topic. Relevance can be expressed
as r(w,k) | = λ log(φkw) + (1 – λ) log (φkw / pw), where λ is the weight of the
probability of term w under topic k relative to its lift.
117
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Figure 7: pyLDAvis View of Antitrust Cases Containing
“Trinko”
Figure 7 shows how our algorithms have sorted antitrust
cases with the word “Trinko” into four topics. 121 In the screen
shot, topic 4 is highlighted, bringing up its top terms. With
pyLDAvis and the other visualizations, the platform user can
set the number of topics manually. Here, the model is
comprised of five topic bubbles.
Two additional points are notable. First, generic words
such as “court,” “see,” “claim,” and “plaintiff” are prevalent in
the initial results. Although their presence renders the topics
more generic, their appearance validates our machine learning
because antitrust cases are replete with these words—words
that algorithms are not trained to filter out.122 We can refine the
results by excluding generic words from the visualizations.123
See Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540
U.S. 398 (2004). Trinko reset the balance between antitrust and regulation
while also gutting the essential facilities doctrine.
122 Our platform has the capacity to exclude these generic terms in the
construction of visualizations.
123 Excluded words are tagged as “stop words.” At this point, the platform
can only filter out up to nine stop words.
121
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Second, these three types of visualizations are different than
Word2Vec, which has been the visualization of choice on many
legal research projects so far.124 From a methodological
perspective, our project therefore pushes machine learning in
legal scholarship beyond word-level analysis, by building topic
and even meta-topic models.
Finally, we have begun to read the top cases within each
topic to see how courts think through market power. For
example, we reviewed cases within the topics highlighted in
Figure 11 below where “relev[ant]” was a top word; then we
read cases in other topics, where “relev[ant]” had a lower
probability distribution, presumably because the relevant
product and geographic markets were not defined. (In each
topic, cases are ordered by the probability score of that topic’s
appearance in the case.)
IV. RESULTS
To test our modifications to LDA, we analyze large
numbers of federal antitrust cases up to 2018, which we
extracted from CAP. The machine-generated visualizations
shed light on two vexing areas of antitrust law: market power
and the balance between antitrust and regulation. Because law
is a text-heavy field, topic modeling is particularly appropriate
as an analytical tool. And because antitrust concepts are openended and resolved through the deliberation of associated
terms, antitrust is an apt place to start.
Our results fall into three categories. The first category
consists of big-picture observations that flow from the
macroscopic perspective of topic models. These observations
validate certain doctrinal views articulated in prior scholarship
on matters such as deregulation and market power. The second
category is comprised of observations that challenge
straightforward interpretation. In these results, the cases do not

For a description of Word2Vec, see Amanda Levendowski, How Copyright
Law Can Fix Artificial Intelligence’s Implicit Bias Problem, 93 WASH. L. REV. 579
(2018).
124
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seem to fit with their categorization in a topic, which raises
questions about the sensitivity and accuracy of the algorithms.
The third category consists of results that raise questions about
traditional caselaw research. These questions include how
commercial legal databases execute their searches and what
constitutes good precedent in antitrust.
We understand that legal scholars are often skeptical of
algorithmic processing and, except for those in the CLA camp,
have generally refrained from employing them in research. For
all their utopian promises, algorithms in society seem to
amplify rather than eliminate human biases.125 Accordingly,
because we rely so heavily on algorithms for this project, we
have tried to be cautious in their use and in our conclusions.
Therefore, rather than disrupting for disruption’s sake, we offer
topic modeling as a way to affirm—but also to complicate—
traditional research and prior conclusions on antitrust doctrine.
The remainder of this Section offers a doctrinal primer
on market power and the antitrust–regulation balance. Then it
categorizes our observations.
A. A Doctrinal Primer
1.

Market power

Market power is a concept fraught with controversy.
Conceptually, it is easy to grasp: market power means the
ability to set price above a producer’s marginal cost.126
Practically, however, it is difficult to prove. Direct evidence,
such as of anticompetitive effects, if often too hard to come by.
Hence, courts must abide by circumstantial evidence of market
power, which uses market share as a proxy.
See, e.g., Amanda Levendowski, How Copyright Law Can Fix Artificial
Intelligence’s Implicit Bias Problem, 93 WASH. L. REV. 579 (2018); Jack Balkin,
The Three Laws of Robotics in the Age of Big Data, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 1217 (2017);
Dan L. Burk, Algorithmic Fair Use, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 283 (2019); Kiel BrennanMarquez & Stephen E. Henderson, Artificial Intelligence and Role Reversible
Judgment, 109 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOL. 137 (2019).
126 William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases,
94 HARV. L. REV. 937, 939 (1981).
125
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This paradigm—market definition/market share—has
become both the prevailing way of gauging market power and,
simultaneously, the target of generations of fierce criticism. In
the first step of the paradigm, a relevant product market is
defined, enabling the subsequent calculation of a defendant’s
relevant market share.127 The product market is drawn, in
technical terms, as the smallest grouping of sales where the
elasticities of demand and supply are low enough that a
monopolist controlling the grouping could reduce output and
increase price substantially above marginal cost.128 Then the
relevant geographical market is defined along similar lines and
the defendant’s geographic market share is also calculated.
Market definition has come under fire from scholars for
decades because of its imprecision.129 The controversy stretches
back to one of the first major market power cases, U.S. v. du
Pont,130 where the Supreme Court accepted a test of market
power that came to be so disparaged, the case became the
namesake for the error: the cellophane fallacy. In du Pont, the
Court accepted the defendant’s definition of the market as all
flexible wrapping materials, including products like wax paper
and aluminum foil, rather than cellophane itself131—even
though these substitutes were able to compete with cellophane
precisely because du Pont had been underpricing it.132 In short,
the Court conflated the elasticity of demand for a product with
the cross-elasticity, or reasonable interchangeability, of the
product and its substitute. For this and other reasons,
commentators have condemned market definition for its
incoherence.133
HOVENKAMP, supra note 82, at 92.
Id. at 93 n.2.
129 See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Why (Ever) Define Markets?, 124 HARV. L. REV. 437,
440 (2010); Herbert Hovenkamp, Markets in Merger Analysis, 57 ANTITRUST
BULL. 887, 891, 894–95 (2012); Landes & Posner, supra note 125.
130 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
131 Id. at 399–400.
132 See Jonathan B. Baker, Market Definition: An Analytical Overview, 74
ANTITRUST L.J. 129 (2007).
133 See Kaplow, supra note 126. For a reply, see Gregory J. Werden, Why (Ever)
Define Markets? An Answer to Professor Kaplow, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 729, 740
(2013).
127
128

9/29/2020 9:03 AM

DRAFT

2020]

MINING THE CAP

37

In dynamic markets, which today consist primarily of
Internet markets, circumstantial evidence of market power is
less important.134 Reliance on market definition/market share
can even lead to erroneous results—most notably, the inclusion
of both merchant and consumer interfaces into a two-sided
platform where a complaint alleges harm only to one side.135
Nonetheless, examinations of collusion and exclusion
are seldom complete without market power analysis of the
constituent markets. Market power is the very first step, for
instance, in a monopolization action under Section 2 of the
Sherman Act,136 the basis for many of the charges against tech
firms.137 It is therefore a hugely important yet open-ended issue
that is assuming even greater urgency.
2.

Balancing antitrust and regulation

Another contested issue in antitrust is how courts
approach competition in regulated industries such as finance,
telecommunications, and health care. In the 1960s, cases on the
balance between antitrust and regulation such as Silver v. New
York Stock Exchange followed a “plain repugnancy” standard,
where courts strived to permit the cohabitation of regulation
and antitrust, precluding the latter only where the former
clearly pre-empted it.138 In the next decade, plain repugnancy
became simply repugnancy,” under which antitrust was to
defer if there was just the potential for conflict with
regulation.139 Significantly, this body of law came in contexts
where the statutes in question did not contain an express
antitrust savings clause that preserved antitrust actions, so
courts were dealing with implied antitrust immunity. In 2004,
Howard A. Shelanski, Information, Innovation, and Competition Policy for the
Internet, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1663, 1674 (2013).
135 See Ohio v. American Express Co., 585 U.S. ___ (2018). For criticisms, see
John M. Newman, Antitrust in Digital Markets, 72 VAND. L. REV. 1497 (2019).
136 This is the “power plus conduct” framework of Grinnell, 384 U.S. 563
(1966), and U.S. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
137 CHRIS SAGERS, UNITED STATES V. APPLE: COMPETITION IN AMERICA (2019).
138 See, e.g., Silver v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963).
139 See Gordon v. New York Stock Exchange, Inc., 422 U.S. 659 (1975).
134
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however, the Court in Trinko found that even a statute with an
antitrust savings clause—namely, the Telecommunications Act
of 1990—could preclude the application of antitrust laws
because of the potential for conflict.140
Over the last half century, then, the doctrine balancing
antitrust and regulation has conferred federal courts greater
discretion to dismiss private actions over conduct that might be
regulated by administrative agencies. In moving from plain
repugnancy to simple repugnancy to presumed repugnancy,
this doctrine now requires antitrust to defer when regulation
has spoken, however quietly. Concomitantly, however,
regulators have undergone a paradigm shift in the last half
century, moving away from the filed rate doctrine, whereby
natural monopolies had to abide by rates filed with the
Interstate Commerce Commission (“ICC”).141 With the gutting
and eventual abolition of the ICC, this intrusive regulation was
replaced with a framework that prioritizes market transactions,
with regulators merely setting the baselines for competition, a
trend commonly but inaccurately called deregulation.142
The consequences of these shifts are grave. Where
regulators have promulgated—and then rescinded—rules to
pre-empt anticompetitive effects,143 federal courts might not
step in to fill the void as a consequence of presumed
repugnancy. In bowing to regulators, courts can foster
anticompetitive effects, which hampers innovation and cheats
consumers. Since in Trinko, academics have offered a flurry of
proposals to overhaul the balance between antitrust and

See Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540
U.S. 398 (2004).
141 See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 24, at 1330–34.
142 Id. at 1324–25, 1336–37.
143 Compare Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, FCC 15-24, GN
Docket No. 14-28, Report and Order on Remand, Declaratory Ruling, and
Order (Mar. 12, 2015) (promulgating net neutrality rules), with Restoring
Internet Freedom, FCC 17-108, Declaratory Ruling, Report and Order, and
Order (Dec. 14, 2017) (repealing net neutrality rules).
140
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regulation.144 In our era of regulatory abdication, scholars are
looking to antitrust to step into the voids.145 Whether those
proposals materialize depends in large part on how courts
strike that balance.
B.

Observations and Inferences

In this Subsection, we present and categorize our
observations from topic modeling and, where possible, draw
preliminary inferences—recognizing that some inferences may
be premature and require further research. Each of the three sets
of visualizations we employ—multilevel, pyLDAvis, and topic
browser—comes with its own advantages and drawbacks.
Consequently, we approach modeling algorithms as an
iterative process, adjusting where possible.
1.
a.

Macrotrends

Diversification of market power cases

Topic modeling is adept at highlighting macrotrends. To
harness that power, we incorporated a histogram function into
topic browser view that shows the relative proportion of each
topic in the corpus as time progresses. In running histograms,
we can immediately see how the Market Power and Antitrust–
Regulation corpora have changed over the decades (see Figure
8 below).

See Brett Frischmann & Spencer Weber Waller, Revitalizing Essential
Facilities, 75 ANTITRUST L.J. 1 (2008); Howard A. Shelanski, The Case for
Rebalancing Antitrust and Regulation, 109 MICH. L. REV. 683 (2011); Adam
Candeub, Trinko and Re-Grounding the Refusal to Deal Doctrine, 66 U. PITT. L.
REV. 821 (2005).
145 See, eg., Samuel N. Weinstein, Financial Regulation in the (Receding) Shadow
of Antitrust, 91 TEMP. L. REV. 447 (2019); Tim Wu, Antitrust via Rulemaking:
Competition Catalysis, 16 COLO. TECH. L. J. 33 (2017).
144
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Figure 8: Topic Browser Stacked View with Histogram of
Market Power Corpus
Starting in the late 1950s, market power cases exploded.
Initially these cases were concentrated in the banking sector,
where a slew of mergers were stayed by regulators and taken
to court. Bank merger cases are unique enough to comprise a
topic of their own, Topic 17, where several of the top terms are
financial
(e.g.,
“bank,”
“market,”
“compani[es],”
“competit[ion],” “merger,” “area,” and “loan”).146 Starting in
the 1970s, however, the number of cases in this topic declines
rapidly, both in absolute numbers and as a proportion of the
entire Market Power Corpus.147

Here the top cases are U.S. v. Connecticut National Bank, 362 F.Supp. 240
(D. Conn. 1973), vacated by U.S. v. Connecticut National Bank, 418 U.S. 656
(1974); U.S. v. Phillipsburg Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 306 F.Supp. 645 (D.N.J.
1969), vacated by U.S. v. Phillipsburg Nat. Bank & Trust Co. 399 U.S. 350
(1970).
147 The total number of market power cases can be verified on CAP’s
historical trends tracker. A search on CAP for federal cases with “antitrust”
and “market power,” for instance, shows that while antitrust cases have
increased dramatically, market power caes have held steady. See Historical
Trends, CASELAW ACCESS PROJECT, https://case.law/trends/ (search for “us:
antitrust, market power”).
146
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The only other topic to undergo such a drastic decline is
Topic 9, which includes mostly tying cases. Under the Sherman
and Clayton acts’ tying prohibitions, a seller cannot condition
the availability of one item (the desired product) on the buyer’s
purchase of another item (the tied product). Tying cases are
among antitrust’s most complicated because courts and
scholars have never agreed precisely on whether the practice
merits per se treatment or rule of reason review. According to
the leverage theory, if a monopolist dominates the desired
product market, then the monopolist can leverage its way into
dominance in the tied product market by conditioning the
availability of the desired product on the purchase of the tied
product.148 Afterward, the monopolist can extract two sets of
monopoly rents. The Chicago school, however, has succeeded
in advancing its single monopoly profit theory, which holds
that a true monopolist does not need to leverage its way into a
tied product market because it can already extract rents in the
desired product market. 149 Even though the Supreme Court
continued to treat tying as per se illegal,150 scholars have backed
away from an unequivocal per se stance for decades. Recent
work by economists and law scholars has vindicated parts of
the leverage theory.151
In place of tying and bank merger cases, litigationrelated topics have assumed greater prominence. These include

See HOEVENKAMP, supra note 80, at 459.
e.g., Ward S. Bowman, Jr., Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem,
67 YALE L.J. 19 (1957); Richard S. Markovits, Tie-ins, Reciprocity, and the
Leverage Theory, 76 YALE L.J. 1397 (1967); Richard A. Posner, The Chicago
School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925 (1979).
150 See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984); Eastman
Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
151 See, e.g., See Patrick Rey & Jean Tirole, A Primer on Foreclosure 1, in
HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION III (Mark Armstrong & Rob Porter
eds., 2006); Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death of the Single
Monopoly Profit Theory, 123 HARV. L. REV. 397 (2009). See also Thomas G.
Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals’
Costs to Achieve Power over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209, 242 (1986).
148

149 See,

DRAFT

9/29/2020 9:03 AM

42

a general litigation topic (Topic 18),152 a general merger topic
(Topic 15),153 and a class actions topic that took off in 1998.154
The trajectory is one of market power cases diversifying over
time, spanning different types of claims and procedural
strategies, such as class actions. As for the topics that declined
in influence, the fall of bank merger cases is consistent with the
increasing permissiveness of antitrust and financial regulators;
rather than suing to block bank mergers, regulators were
content to let the financial services industry consolidate after
the 1970s.155 This was especially pronounced as financial
markets began to internationalize, which led to broader
relevant geographic markets being defined more broadly and
U.S. regulators easing up on consolidation to give domestic
industries an advantage in cross-border competition. As for the
waning of the tying topic, this coincided with the years the
Supreme Court decided two seminal tying cases, Jefferson Parish
Hospital in 1984 and Eastman Kodak in 1992.156 However, ours is
not a controlled study, and there may be confounding factors.
Tying cases started to abate, for instance, when the Chicago
school became ascendant.

In Topic 18, the top terms are “alleg[ation],” “claim,” “market”,
“antitrust,” and “complaint.” The top cases are Wagner v. Circle W. Mastiffs,
732 F. Supp. 2d 792 (S.D. Ohio 2010); Bushnell Corp v. ITT, 973 F. Supp. 1276
(D. Kan. 1997); and Wolf Concept SARL v. Eber Bros Wine & Liquor Corp, 736
F. Supp. 2d 661 (W.D.N.Y. 2010).
153 In Topic 15, the top terms are “market,” “merger,” “custom[er],”
“product,” “compet[ition],” “FTC,” “price,” “injunc[tion],” and “relev[ant].”
The top cases are FTC v. Whole Foods Market, Inc., 502 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C.
2007), reversed by F.T.C. v. Whole Foods Market, Inc., 548 F.3d 1028 (D.C.Cir.
2008); FTC v. CCC Holdings Inc., 605 F.Supp.2d 26 (D.D.C. 2009); and FTC v
Whole Foods Market, Inc., 548 F.3d.
154 In Topic 1, the top terms include “class,” “price,” “member,”
“certif[ication],” “claim,” and “common.” The top cases are In re Processed
Egg Products Antitrust Litig., 312 F.R.D. 124 (E.D. Pa. 2015); In re Titanium
Dioxide Antitrust Litig., 959 284 F.R.D. 328 (D. Md. 2012).
155 See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Transformation of the U.S. Financial Services
Industry, 1975–2000: Competition, Consolidation, and Increased Risks, 2002 U.
ILL. L. REV. 215.
156 Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984); Eastman
Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
152
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Deregulation

The Antitrust–Regulation Corpus, too, exhibited
diversification over time, with cases spanning various
industries and regulatory schemes. In this vein, the decline of
two topics is notable: a regulated industries topic (Topic 12)157
and a banking and telecommunications topic (Topic 3).158
Coinciding with their decline, general antitrust litigation topics
rose sharply.159
These swings cohere with a broader pattern that scholars
have previously noticed, where cases pertaining to the
Interstate Commerce Commission (“ICC”) were supplanted by
telecommunications cases and other garden variety antitrust
litigation. The ICC has its roots in the Interstate Commerce Act
of 1887, which formulated the strict rate-setting rules of the filed
rate doctrine, pursuant to which regulated entities were to file
their rates with the commission.160 The dwindling of ICC cases
portends a shift away from public utility-style regulation and
toward a framework where regulators simply set ground rules
designed to maximize competition within an industry, such as
In Topic 12, the top terms include “commiss[ion],” “rate,” “carrier,”
“order,” “file,” “power,” “regul[ation],” “rule,” “tariff,” “transport[ation],”
“agenc[y],” “FERC,” and “ICC.” The top cases are American Trucking Ass’n
v. ICC, 467 U.S. 354 (1984); Brizendine v. Cotter & Co., 4 F.3d 457 (7th Cir. 1993),
vacated by Cotter & Co. v. Brizendine, 511 U.S. 1103 (1994), in consideration
of Security Services, Inc. v. Kmart Corp., 511 U.S. 431 (1994); and Security
Services, Inc. v. Kmart Corp., 511 U.S. 431 (1994). Note that the topic cites
American Trucking from September 1981, but no such case exists.
158 In Topic 3, the top terms include “bank,” “cabl[e],” “broadcast,”
“televise[ion],” “program,” “station,” “competit[ion,” licens[e],” and
“commiss[ion].” The top cases are U.S. v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S.
602 (1974); and Satellite Broadcasting & Commun. Ass’n v. FCC, 275 F.3d 337
(4th Cir. 2001). Interestingly, the early cases are bank merger cases, but the
later cases are cable company cases. Both types of cases engage with similar
vocabularies.
159 This includes Topic 19, whose top terms are “claim,” “alleg[ation,”
“complaint,” “dismiss,” “motion,” “state,” and “action.” The top cases are
Caraang v. PNC Mortgage, 795 F. Supp. 2d 1098 (D. Haw. 2011); and Sonterra
Caital Master Fund Ltd. v. Credit Suisse Group AG, 277 F. Supp. 3d 521
(S.D.N.Y. 2017).
160 Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of
Regulated Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1330-34 (1998).
157
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the Telecommunications Act of 1996, a trend commonly
(though not altogether accurately) called deregulation. 161

Figure 9: Topic Browser Stacked View with Histogram of
Antitrust–Regulation Corpus
Topic browser histograms are a good starting point for
historical trends. However, because topic browser view lists
dozens of terms for each topic, the details can quickly
overwhelm. As a supplement, then, we use the multilevel
visualizations of aggregated modeling to eliminate the “noise”
and scale up to a higher level of abstraction: topic clusters. This
type of visualization can reveal the clusters that now make up
the Antitrust–Regulation Corpus, giving a snapshot of how
cases and topics have splintered (see Figure 9).

161
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Figure 10: Multilevel Visualization of Antitrust–Regulation
Corpus
In Figure 10, the Antitrust–Regulation Corpus is broken
down into twenty-one clusters that correspond to the
regulatory frameworks where antitrust litigation frequently
arises.
These
include
patent,162
health
care,163
telecommunications,164 securities and stock exchanges,165
insurance,166 labor,167 power and electricity service,168
banking,169 and milk powder regulations.170 Significantly,
Cluster 9, the largest topic cluster, covers 30 topics that share
the term “agreement.” These topics cover multiple industries,
including transportation, health care, technology, sports, credit
cards, telecommunications, and airlines.
The prevalence of “agreement” in Cluster 9 suggests that
a plaintiff’s framing of the defendants’ actions as a conspiracy,
contract, or other agreement is the most common strategy. The
per se illegality of conspiracies under antitrust obviates the
need to gather additional evidence if a plaintiff can successfully
couch the defendant’s conduct as an agreement in violation of
the Sherman or Clayton Act.171 Indeed, collusive acts such as
price-fixing and market division are often viewed as the core of
antitrust prohibitions.172 In the difficult instances where
defendants mirror one another in conduct, factors that lead to
the inference of agreement can move a case from one of

Cluster 15.
Cluster 14.
164 Cluster 18.
165 Cluster 3.
166 Cluster 19.
167 Cluster 6.
168 Cluster 11.
169 Cluster 7.
170 Cluster 0.
171 The antitrust cases standing for the proposition that agreement cannot be
inferred from ambiguous evidence are also the classic summary judgment
cases. See, e.g., Matsushita Electrical Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 574 (1986).
172 See Jonathan B. Baker, Exclusion as a Core Competition Concern, 78
ANTITRUST L.J. 527, 545 (2013).
162
163
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conscious parallelism to coordination.173 Against this doctrinal
backdrop, many of the cases in Cluster 9 feature agreements
permitted by a regulatory frameworks but nonetheless charged
by plaintiffs as anticompetitive.174
c.

Industrial change

The histograms also tell an intriguing story about
industrial change. In both corpora, there are declines in topics
where “manufacturing” and “dealer” are among the top terms.
This decline is particularly notable as a counterpoint to the
finding of Steven Salop and Lawrence White over thirty years
ago that manufacturing was overrepresented in private
antitrust suits.175 In their seminal article analyzing data from the
Georgetown Private Antitrust Litigation Study (the
“Georgetown Study”), Professors Salop and White found that
44.3 percent of defendants and 24.1 percent of plaintiffs hailed
from the manufacturing sector.176 These results correlate with
the types of claims that predominated in the Georgetown
dataset: refusals to deal, horizontal price fixing, tying or
exclusive dealing, and price discrimination—claims reflecting
disputes between retailers or wholesalers and their suppliers.177

The antitrust literature on parallelism is rich. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner,
Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1562
(1969); Donald F. Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act:
Conscious Parallelism and Refusals To Deal, 75 HARV. L. REV. 655 (1962); C. Scott
Hemphill & Tim Wu, Parallel Exclusion, 122 YALE L.J. 1182 (2013). For an
illustration, see In re Text Messaging Antitrust Litigation, 630 F.3d 622 (7th Cir.
2010); In re Text Messaging Antitrust Litigation, 782 F.3d 867 (7th Cir. 2015).
174 See, e.g., Kartell v. Blue Shield of Massachusetts, 542 F.Supp. 782 (D. Mass.
1982); Board of Com’rs of Port of New Orleans v. Federal maritime
Commission, 440 F.2d 1312 (5th Cir. 1971); Metropolitan Intercollegiate
Basketball Ass’n v. National Collegiate Athletics Ass’n, 337 F.Supp.2d 563
(S.D.N.Y. 2004).
175 Steven C. Salop & Lawrence J. White, Economic Analysis of Private Antitrust
Litigation, 74 GEO. L.J. 1001, 1004–05 (1986). For more on the Georgetown
Project, see Lawrence J. White, The Georgetown Study of Private Antitrust
Litigation, 543 ANTITRUST L.J. 59 (1985).
176 Id.
177 Id. at 1005.
173
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Data from the Georgetown Study end in 1983, but from
our corpora, we can infer that in the following decades, there is
a decline in manufacturing and dealer cases but a rise in health
care and patent cases, as a proportion of antitrust decisions
overall.178 To the extent these patterns reveal a shift in antitrust
litigation, they may also betray a supplanting of manufacturing
by health care, intellectual property, and other sectors. At a
doctrinal level, we know, too, that tying and refusals to deal
have been pared back by the courts.179 And at a procedural
level, we can perceive a marked rise in antitrust class actions.
Altogether, these trends appear to confirm the waning of
American manufacturing and, as a corollary, the demise of
antitrust litigation between retailers and suppliers.
2.

Inference challenges

Our visualizations do present challenges for drawing
inferences. For a variety of reasons, some top cases in a topic
wind up being aberrant upon review. The frequent examples
are cases that do not engage substantively with market
power.180 We can partially pre-empt such results by screening
for cases where query words (e.g., “market power”) appear
more than a desired number of times (e.g., 10 times). In this
way, the visualizations will be compiled only out of those cases.
The comparison of the Georgetown Study and our corpora is not an
apples-to-apples comparison. The Georgetown Study was the joint effort of
many attorneys reviewing and hand coding 2,350 antitrust cases from 1973
to 1983 in five federal districts. By contrast, our dataset is every federal
antitrust decision up to late 2018—some 35,000 cases. Our dataset is both
broader and narrower than the Georgetown dataset. While Salop and White
covered settled cases, we can only look at cases that resulted in a judicial
opinion. But our timelines and jurisdictions are broader, and we can also
delve more deeply into the language of the cases.
179 See, e.g., Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko,
540 U.S. 398 (2004).
180 E.g., Wagner v. Circle W. Mastiffs, 732 F. Supp. 2d 792 (S.D. Ohio 2010)
(the top case in the general litigation Topic 18, featuring virtually no
discussion of market power because it was a price fixing case); Bushnell
Corp v. ITT, 973 F. Supp. 1276 (D. Kan. 1997) (second top case in Topic 18,
with no consideration of market power, where Sherman Act § 1 and § 2
claims were dismissed because the plaintiff presented insufficient evidence).
178
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However, the interest for precise results must be
balanced against the ability of machine learning to create
visualizations that portray the corpora in new ways. A corpus
can be restricted algorithmically, for instance, by excluding
generic words (e.g., “court,” “law,” “plaintiff,” and
“defendant”) or by collecting cases that mention key words
more than a threshold number of times. Yet at some point, this
strips away a key benefit of the topic modeling: to discern
relationships among terms that we might otherwise gloss
over.181
a.

Aberrant results

Users of topic modeling must bear in mind that the
algorithm constructs topics out of the terms that are most
statistically likely to appear together. Thus, a case may be
pushed to the forefront of a tying topic even though the opinion
mentions tying only once—if the rest of the opinion contains all
the other terms associated with the topic.182 This is another
common spurious result—one that, at this point, can only be
identified by reading individual cases. Of course, the user of
commercial databases must vet search results as well, so the
requirement to actually read cases is not unique to topic
modeling.
By way of comparison, in the Georgetown Study,
Professors Salop and White quantified cases where antitrust
was not the central issue but ancillary to a contract or tort claim
(“noncentral cases”) at 21.6 percent of the corpus, a fairly
sizeable proportion.183 Relatedly, 2.4 percent of the Georgetown
corpus featured cases where an antitrust action was appended

For now, we have also chosen to restrict our analysis to more general
queries so as to quickly identify the algorithms’ deficiencies.
182 See, e.g., Smith v. Mobil Oil Corp., 667 F. Supp. 1314 (W.D. Mo. 1987) (top
case in tying Topic 9, with no consideration of market power). But see R & G
Affiliates, Inc. v. Knoll International, Inc., 589 F. Supp. 1395 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (the
second top case in Topic 9, which engaged in a substantive analysis of
market power).
183 Salop & White, supra note 171, at 1048–49.
181
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as a counterclaim.184 The specter of treble damages under
private antitrust litigation would give any counterparty pause.
In some areas of law, such as the Bank Holding Company Act’s
anti-tying provisions,185antitrust counterclaims are almost
induced by their quasi-per se treatment.186 It is therefore little
surprise that noncentral decisions lurk in our corpora as well.
b.

Machine versus human associations

In harnessing machine learning as a means of distant
reading, we are essentially replacing human associations of
words and meaning with statistical associations. This, too, can
frustrate inferences. The terms in a topic might carry strong
doctrinal associations. For instance, in the Antitrust–Regulation
Corpus, “immunity” figures prominently in Topic 9 (from topic
browser visualizations), suggesting on a cursory perusal that
this Topic may bear upon the repugnancy doctrine and the
balance between antitrust and regulation. In reviewing the
cases and other terms, we discover that this is actually a Parker
immunity topic concerning antitrust immunity for state action,
as opposed to antitrust immunity through regulatory preemption.187 Parker immunity, or the antitrust state action
doctrine, covers certain state and local regulations that affect
competition, exempting them from federal antitrust laws. It is a
variation on federalism questions more typically encountered
in constitutional law. By contrast, antitrust immunity in
regulatory setting is usually implicates the question of whether
Id. at 1048.
12 U.S.C. § 1972.
186 For more on the bank tying provisions, see Felix B. Chang, Death to Credit
as Leverage: Using the Bank Anti-Tying Provision to Curb Financial Risk, 9 NYU
J. L. & BUS. 851 (2013). Tying counterclaims are often found in cases where a
lender moves against a defaulting borrower.
187 See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). The other top terms in Topic 9
are “state,” “citi[es],” “action,” “power,” “municip[al],” “district,” “noerr”
[after the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine], and “parker.” The top cases are Snake
River Valley Electric Ass’n v. PacifiCorp, 228 F.3d 972 (9th Cir. 2000), Snake
River Valley Electric Ass’n v. PacifiCorp, superseded by (9th Cir. 2001); Town
of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 700 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1983); and Town of Hallie
v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34 (1985).
184
185
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regulation displaces antitrust—and the extent to which an
antitrust savings clause resuscitates private antitrust litigation
from regulatory pre-emption.
We can confirm that Trinko188 and the old cases on
repugnancy such as Silver189 and Gordon190 do appear in Topic
9—they are just not among the top results.191 In fact, Trinko has
a closer association with other topics (i.e., pertaining to
telecommunications, federal legislation, and antitrust
procedure) than with Parker immunity.192 Here again, the result
is not altogether surprising: Trinko comes up under commercial
database searches for federal antitrust cases dealing with the
Telecommunications Act of 1990, the essential facilities
doctrine, and antitrust immunity.193 Put differently, a case can
constitute precedent in a number of areas.
Altogether, these instances of imprecision in topic
modeling—at least what the human eye perceives as intuitively
imprecise—complicate the ability to efficiently test research
questions. As a more tangible example, we might infer
something about how frequently courts engage in market
definition from the fact that the term “relev[ant]” does not
appear across even half of the topics in the Market Power
Corpus (see Figure 11).

Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S.
398 (2004).
189 Silver v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963).
190 Gordon v. New York Stock Exchange, Inc., 422 U.S. 659 (1975).
191 The platform has a “bibliography” feature that lists all cases.
192 Trinko has a 48.3% association with Topic 11 (top words “service[e],”
“fcc,” and “commiss[ion”), a 13.8% association with Topic 10 (top words
“market,” “claim,” “competit[ion],” “antitrust,” and “evid[ence]”), and a
11.7% association with Topic 8 (top words “state,” “unit,” “congress,” and
“statut[e]”). It has only a 5.8% association with Topic 9.
193 Interestingly, Trinko is not among the top 20 results in Westlaw under a
search for “antitrust /p regulation /p immunity.” Notably, Billing v. Credit
Suisse First Boston Ltd., 426 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2005), the lower court decision
of a Supreme Court opinion closely associated with Trinko, does appear as
the seventh result.
188
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Figure 11: Topic Browser View of Topics Containing
“Relev[ant]”
We might reasonably attribute this to two possibilities:
either a court has accepted one party’s market definition, or a
court directly finds market power because there is evidence of
anticompetitive effects. Yet “effect” also does not appear across
many topics (see Figure 11), which is hardly surprising, since
anticompetitive effects are difficult enough for economists to
measure and even harder for courts to articulate. Significantly,
the terms “relev[ant]” and “effect” do not overlap in topics, so
we might also postulate that courts are using them as
alternative proxies for market power.
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Figure 12: Topic Browser View of Topics Containing “Effect”
As we read the cases in the topics, however, we see that
these inferences must be cautiously drawn. For instance, even
within topics where “relev” is not highlighted as among the
words (each topic lists approximately 50 top words), we find
that courts often do take up the relevant product market, even
if in cursory form. There simply may have been 50 other words
that show much more frequently in the topic than “relev.”194
Again, however, we should not resort to filtering out too many
terms that we consider generic, lest we sacrifice the fresh
perspective of machine learning.

See Chuang et al., supra note 42 (“In-depth analyses may require more
than inspection of individual words. Analysts may want additional context
in order to verify observed patterns and trust that their interpretation is
accurate.”).
194
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V. SUPPLEMENTING TRADITIONAL RESEARCH
Nearly a decade ago, scholars in computer science, the
field where topic modeling was invented, noted that modeldriven visual analytics can suffer from problems of
interpretation and trust. They defined interpretation as “the
facility with which an analyst makes inferences about the
underlying data” and trust as “the actual and perceived
accuracy of an analyst’s inferences.”195 Today, topic modeling
has entered legal scholarship, and we hold out aggregated
modeling as an improvement. Clearly, though, problems with
interpretation linger—not to mention trust.
This Section addresses problems of interpretation and
trust with topic modeling, extending the analysis to legal
research more generally. In doing so, it suggests how the
technique can both complicate and supplement traditional
research.
A. A Modest Proposal
As noted above, there are impediments to drawing neat,
clean inferences from our models. We acknowledge that, left
unaddressed, these impediments can snowball into problems of
trust. Hence, we have pursued modifications that shore up
topic modeling’s interpretative facilities at a basic level, which
bolsters our scholarly community’s receptivity toward—or
trust of—the tool. Embedding a document reader feature in
both multilevel and topic browser views enables our platform’s
users to pull up every case in a cluster or topic. In turn, cases
can be read more thoroughly to check their conformity with
their respective topics. This feature allows us to vet how topic
modeling’s information retrieval function scales to law.
In its early years, topic modeling was deployed to
recommend scientific articles in a way that broke down

195

Id. at 2.
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disciplinary silos and cut through citation biases.196 Some of the
first computer scientists to experiment with collaborative topic
modeling, for example, realized that researchers rely on
citations to discover articles similar to one they have
encountered, which reinforces the bias toward heavily cited
papers.197 Consequently, a scholar will tend to cite others within
her discipline, at the expense of finding relevant literature in
another field.198 Topic modeling was devised as a powerful
alternative, to catch the interdisciplinary linkages that might
otherwise be overlooked. Staying true to this legacy, we argue
that the best use of topic modeling—for now—might well be its
ability to suggest areas of overlooked scholarship or doctrine.199
As a more concrete example, when we see that an
immunity topic contains a high number of state action cases
along with classic decisions on antitrust repugnancy,200 we
would read this as a suggestion for scholars interested in
antitrust savings clauses to look into Parker immunity. A
narrow search for savings clauses, focusing on landmark cases
such as Trinko and Credit Suisse,201 might otherwise miss this
connection, directing the researcher simply to the antitrust–
regulation balance. A few scholars writing on the antitrust
immunity have already observed the connections between
regulatory pre-emption and state action,202 as has at least one

See Wang & Blei, supra note 43. See also supra notes 49 and 50 and
accompanying discussion.
197 Wang & Blei, supra note 43.
198 Id.
199 To quote a critic of topic modeling, its utility may well be was a “contentbased recommendation [system] (such as Facebook advertising products to
its users).” Da, supra note 12, at 625.
200 E.g., Snake River Valley Elec. Ass’n v. PacifiCorp, 228 F.3d 972 (9th Cir.
2000); Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 700 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1983). These
are the top two cases in Topic 9 in the Antitrust–Regulation Corpus.
201 Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264 (2007).
202 See Darren Bush, Mission Creep: Antitrust Exemptions and Immunities As
Applied to Deregulated Industries, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 761; Daniel F. Spulber &
Christopher S. Yoo, Mandating Access to Telecom and the Internet: The Hidden
Side of Trinko, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1822 (2007). See also HOVENKAMP, supra
note 82, at § 19.3c.
196
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court.203 Yet this is not an intuitive connection to make; for the
body of writings on state action and regulatory immunity have
existed without much reference to one another.
As we tinker further with topic modeling, we can make
instant improvements to sharpen the platform’s interpretive
precision. One upgrade is extending the numerical filters to
individual terms, rather than a combination of all terms. As of
now, we can screen for pertinent results by running
visualizations on decisions where “antitrust” and “regulation”
occur over a threshold number in each document. However,
that threshold only runs on the combination of search terms.
Thus, in a query for documents where search terms appear 50
times or more, the algorithms return decisions where
“regulation” may appear 49 times in a document but “antitrust”
appears only once. Several of the top decisions in Topic 14 of
the Antitrust–Regulation Corpus, for instance, features the term
“antitrust” only in the context of quoting antitrust cases as
precedent on injunctions.204 What initially appears to be an
antitrust and first amendment topic ends up, at least from the
top documents, as a constitutional law topic with antitrust
caselaw cited for procedural guidance. This is not altogether
surprising, since many foundational civil procedure decisions
spun out of antitrust litigation.205 An easy improvement,
however, is to extend the numerical filters to both “antitrust”
and “regulation.”
The results from Topic discussed above, where the top
results are noncentral cases, also suggest that the proportion of
aberrant results in our two corpora might be quite different. At
the very least, aberrant results arise for different reasons. In the
Antitrust–Regulation Corpus, the top decisions in some topics
only feature the term “antitrust” in the context of discussions of
See American Agriculture Movement v. Board of Trade, City of Chicago,
977 F.2d 1147 (7th Cir. 1992).
204 See, e.g., .g., Kimberlin v. Quinlan, 6 F.3d 789 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Real Truth
About Obama, Inc. v. FEC, 575 F.3d 342 (4th Cir. 2009); Kiser v. Kamdar, 831
F.3d 784 (6th Cir. 2016); O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao Do Vegetal v.
Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 973 (10th Cir. 2004).
205 See, e.g., Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); Matsushita
v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
203
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procedural precedent. In the Market Power Corpus, by contrast,
antitrust issues arise in some decisions only as counterclaims or
ancillary actions, where they are summarily dismissed.
Noncentral or aberrant antitrust decisions emerge more
regularly in the Antitrust–Regulation Corpus. Indeed, the sizes
of the two corpora, with Antitrust–Regulation being roughly
three times the size of Market Power, appears to corroborate
this thesis.
Overall, it is premature to draw any firm conclusion
about the relevance of results, just as it is too early to
aggressively filter out stop words. At this point, because our
aim is to deploy topic modeling for its ability to suggest
unexplored connections to other areas, we should refrain from
steering unsupervised machine learning with too heavy a
human hand. Thus, we currently see the greatest value in topic
modeling’s ability to distant-read an unstructured dataset and
reveal the latent connections.
For a tool as transformative as topic modeling, its usage
as a sort of glorified document retrieval mechanism may seem
to be a modest proposal. However, cross-doctrinal
extrapolation is one of the most common ways that legal
scholarship has advanced.206 Law scholars are fond of arguing
by analogy; topic modeling gives us a better framework for
doing so by drawing attention to shared vocabularies.
Fortifying the algorithm’s interpretive precision is one of the
most important tasks before it gains more widespread usage.
Harnessing the algorithm’s information retrieval prowess also
tests the robustness of its results. If we can prove that aberrant
results are minimal, or at least within the range of prior studies,
then we will have also built a foundation for our community’s
trust.

See, e.g., Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness As Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1709
(1993); Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan
Lockups of the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643 (1998); Jonathan R.
Macey & James P. Holdcroft, Jr., Failure Is An Option: An Ersatz-Antitrust
Approach to Financial Regulation, 120 YALE L.J. 1368 (2011); Darrell A.H.
Miller, Text, History, and Tradition: What the Seventh Amendment Can Teach Us
About the Second, 122 YALE L.J. 852 (2013).
206
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B.

A Bolder Proposal

Combing through topic modeling visualizations raises
interesting questions about the way we read cases and
understand precedent. In each of the datasets, case names
hardly ever surface as top terms. For instance, Lorain Journal,207
Alcoa,208 Grinnell,209 and DuPont,210 all of them classic market
power cases, do not appear as terms in the Market Power
Corpus.211 In a narrowly focused topic—say, on tying—
landmark cases such as Eastman Kodak212 and Jefferson Parish213
do not materialize as terms either. (The notable exception is
Microsoft,214 which shows up more frequently, even being
picked up as a term in multilevel view).215 This suggests that
courts may be relying less on cases and more on a range of terms
and concepts to figure out market power.
Often, cases that appear as the top results are only
infrequently cited by legal scholars. These cases are not
understood to be precedent-setting, though they can be heavily
cited in practitioners’ manuals or by other courts within a
federal district or circuit.216 Another discrepancy from
commercial databases is that topic modeling occasionally
Lorain Journal Co. v. U.S., 342 U.S. 143 (1951).
U.S. v. Alcoa, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
209 U.S. v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
210 U.S. v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
211 Again, we know these cases are part of the corpus because they appear in
the bibliography. See supra note 173.
212 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
213 Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1994).
214 U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
215 In the antitrust-regulation cases, Trinko does not appear as a top term. Yet
we can confirm that this case is picked up in the topic modeling, because
there is a “bibliography” function on the platform that lists all the cases. This
may simply be because Trinko is still relatively recent and has not been cited
by other cases incorporated into the modeling.
216 See supra note 145, and search in Westlaw’s “citing references” function
for Wagner v. Circle W. Mastiffs, 732 F. Supp. 2d 792 (S.D. Ohio 2010); Bushnell
Corp v. ITT, 973 F. Supp. 1276 (D. Kan. 1997); and Wolf Concept SARL v. Eber
Bros Wine & Liquor Corp, 736 F. Supp. 2d 661 (W.D.N.Y. 2010). By contrast,
see supra note 169 and search in “citing references” for Town of Hallie v. City
of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34 (1985), a seminal Parker immunity case.
207
208
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returns decisions that have been overturned or vacated.217
These results might not be troubling in topics dealing with
arcane doctrine (e.g., old ICC cases). For their part, commercial
databases, too, can lead readers to overturned decisions.
Nonetheless, the ability of Lexis and Westlaw to flag a
decision’s precedential value in its metadata is helpful and
cannot yet be replicated by topic modeling.
More fundamentally, the disparity between the top
results from topic modeling and top results from commercial
databases calls for reconciliation, but this is virtually impossible
because users know so little about the search algorithms that
Westlaw and Lexis employ. This opacity is a stark problem.
Surveying search results across six different platforms, Susan
Mart has found astonishing little overlap in the top cases when
a query is run.218 As Professor Mart notes, these inexplicable
results are frustrating because the platform operators reveal
virtually nothing about their algorithms. On a different level,
algorithms compound human biases, and society is urgently reevaluating the use of artificial intelligence for predictive
purposes.219 The lack of “algorithmic accountability” on the
part of commercial databases is a detriment to research and the
legal profession.220
An accountability deficit plagues not just incumbent
databases but insurgent ones as well. Newcomers Casetext,
Fastcase, Ravel (now owned by Lexis), and to some extent
Google are challenging Westlaw and Lexis for the legal research
market.221 They promise to harness innovations in information
See, e.g., Brizendine v. Cotter & Co., 4 F.3d 457 (7th Cir. 1993) (judgment
vacated by Cotter & Co. v. Brizendine, 114 S.Ct. 2095 (1994)).
218 Mart, supra note 34, at 390 (noting “hardly any overlap in the cases that
appear in the top ten results returned by” Castext, Fastcase, Google
Scholar, Lexis Advance, Ravel, and Westlaw).
219 See Cade Metz & Adam Satariano, The Algorithm That Grants Freedom, or
Takes It Away, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2020.
220 See Mart, supra note 34, at 389 (“Algorithmic accountability in legal
databases will help assure researchers of the reliability of their search results
and will allow researchers greater flexibility in mining the rich information
in legal databases. If researchers know generally what a search algorithm is
privileging in its results, they will be better researchers.”).
221 For an empirical comparison of legal research providers, see id.
217
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technology to deliver “faster and smarter” legal research.222
Questions remain nevertheless. Do the insurgents’ marketing
slogans also encompass “cheaper,” especially for academic and
nonprofit communities? And given freely available tools such
as CAP and topic modeling, how relevant are for-profit
providers?
In pairing CAP with topic modeling, we are not
attempting to dethrone the incumbents. Rather, our goals here
are modest—at this stage, as we continue to fine tune
aggregated modeling, we simply seek to supplement
traditional doctrinal research.
However, we would advance a bolder proposal as well:
by being transparent with topic modeling’s weaknesses and
how we are trying to overcome them, we intend to force legal
research providers to be more forthcoming with their
algorithms. This market is seeing more competition than it has
in a long time. Powered by data analytics, upstarts are entering
the market flaunting ever bolder claims. As they encroach upon
Lexis and Westlaw’s market shares, and as the incumbents
defend their positions, both sides will have to justify why users
should opt for their services.
Entering this fray, we have shown that, armed with a free
dataset and some open-source algorithms, lawyers can replicate
some of the search functionalities hiding behind paywalls.
Admittedly, cobbling these functions together requires
technical skills and often financial backing; however,
homemade machine learning will put increasing pressure on
for-profit legal research providers. Because consumers have
more options than ever before, the operators of those paywalls
must make the case for their products, including how they are
superior. And when divergent results arise, as they inevitably
do,223 we anticipate that users will press providers for an
explanation.

What is Fastcase?, FASTCASE, https://www.fastcase.com/about/ (last
accessed Feb. 3, 2020).
223 See Mart, supra note 34, at 390.
222
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VI. CONCLUSION
Topic modeling algorithms can be modified to address
the criticisms of its detractors by providing greater context at
the micro- and macroscopic levels. We have found that
aggregating topic modeling over many iterations helps to
eliminate aberrant results while providing contextualization.
Simultaneously, our adjustments also highlight details that can
serve as metadata to streamline doctrinal research.
There is still much to be done with our platform and
visualizations. Looking ahead, we plan to improve the
platform’s capability to eliminate more generic words. As this
happens, the visualizations will be more informative, and the
cases will be grouped more accurately. Of course, we must
exclude terms with care, lest we comprise the function of
uncovering patters that the machine’s algorithms illuminate.
The source of our dataset, CAP, also raises novel issues.
For instance, the availability of data promises to democratize
legal research, but there are still technical and financial barriers
to data extraction and analysis. As alternatives to large
commercial databases emerge, a pitched battle will unfold to
capture the legal research and analytics market.
We see our project as a step in the use of algorithmic
topic modeling in legal research, especially as a complement to
commercial databases. Ultimately, we hope that our project will
prompt other collaborations between DH and law, while
pressing information technology insurgents to keep legal
research open and cost-effective. In the near term, however, we
can utilize topic modeling for discrete, mundane tasks such as
recommending cases to help scholars and practitioners argue
by analogy. Given the advances of CAP and topic modeling, we
are living in one of the most exciting eras for legal research.
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VII. APPENDIX
This Appendix lists the top 12 topics in the Market Power
Corpus (2,591 total decisions) and the Antitrust–Regulation
Corpus (7,308 total decisions) from topic browser view. In
addition, it provides the proportion of the corpus occupied by
each topic, as well as the top terms and decisions in each topic.
Recall that topics are statistical distributions over terms.
Given its size, Antitrust–Regulation Corpus was filtered
down to decisions where the key terms (“antitrust” and
“regulation”) occur more than approximately 20 times in each
decision, resulting in a total of 3,527 documents.
For both corpora, we excluded the stop words “court,”
“law,” “plaintiff,” “defend,” “defendant,” “see,” “act,”
“plaintiffs,” and “defendants” from the visualizations.
Market Power Corpus
Topic

Top Terms

Top Decisions

Number/
Proportion
of Corpus
18 (23.4%)

alleg[ation],

claim,

Wagner v. Circle M. Mastiffs

market,

antitrust,

(Aug. 2010); Bushnell Corp. v. ITT

complaint,

inc,

cir,

Corp. (July 1997); Wolf Concept

motion, dismiss, state,

S.A.R.L. v. Eber Brox. Wine &

competit[ion],

Liquor Corp. (Aug. 2010); Full

injuri[es],
agreement,

action,
conduct,

fact, must, relev[ant]

Draw
Sports,

Productions
Inc.

(Dec.

v.

Easton

1997);

JES

Properties, Inc. v. USA Equestrian,
Inc. (Mar. 2003)

9 (10.7%)

tie, product, market,

Smith v. Mobil Oil Corp. (July

inc,

1987); R & G Affiliates, Inc. v.

power,

purchas[e], state, case,

Knoll

cir,

contract,

Mozart Co. v. Mercedes-Benz of

arrang[ement], claim,

North America, Inc. (Sept. 1984);

dealer,

Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc.

corp[orate],

sale,
district,

Int’l,

Inc.

(June

1984);

9/29/2020 9:03 AM

DRAFT

2020]

MINING THE CAP
evid[ence],

fact,

franchis[e]
19 (7.7%)

price,
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(Apr. 1970); Anderson v. Home
Style Stores, Inc. (Apr. 1973)

evid[ence],

conspiraci[es],

Rossi v. Standard Roofing, Inc.
(Sept. 1998); Zenith Radio Corp. v.

juri[sdiction],

case,

Matsushita Electric Industrial Co.

market,

state,

(Mar. 1981); Rossi v. Standard

agreement,

Roofing,

alleg[ation],

claim,

Inc.

(Mar.

1997);

Muenster Butane, Inc. v. Stewart

damag[es],

Co. (July 1981); Sunkist Growers,

manufactur[er],

Inc. v. Winckler & Smith Citrus

antitrust,

Products Co. (Sept. 1960)

cir,

busi[ness],
compani[es],

competit[ion], dealer
25 (4.2%)

commiss[ion], carrier,

American Trucking Ass’n v. ICC

rate,

(Sept. 1981); Water Transport

regul[ation],

requir[e],

state,

author,

Ass’n

v.

ICC

(June

1987);

decis[ion],

Burlington Northern Railroad v.

exempt, icc, railroad,

United Transportation Union Int’l

agenc[y], agreement,

(June 1988); Regular Common

case,

Carrier Conference v. U.S. (June

competit[ion],

congress

1987); Central & Southern Motor
Freight Tariff Ass’n v. U.S. (Mar.
1985)

21 (4.1%)

state,

district,

case,

Lockyer v. .Mirant Corp. (Feb.

unit,

claim,

2005); United Phosphorus, Ltd. v.

jurisdict[ion],

right,

Angus chemical Co. (Mar. 2003);

arbitr[ation],

Monsanto Co. v. McFarling (Aug.

feder[al],

issu[e],

2002); Rohm & Haas Co. v.

parti[es],

also,

antitrust,

appeal,

action,

Dawson Chemical Co. (Jan. 1983)

applic[ation], effect
12 (4.0%)

hospit[al],

state,

Daniel v. Am. Bd. of Emergency

medic[al/ine],

Medicine (Nov. 1997); Islami v.

gener[al/ic],

Covenant Medical Center, Inc.

agreement, antitrust,

(Dec. 1992); Friedman v. Delaware

new,

patient,

County Memorial Hosp. (Oct.

physician, univers[al],

1987); Ezpeleta v. Sisters of Mercy
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action, case, center,

Health Corp. (Aug. 1986); Reddy

claim

v. Good Samaritan Hosp. &
Health Center (Sept. 2000)

5 (3.9%)

price,

retail,

Hoover Color Corp. v. Bayer

competit[ion],

sale,

Corp.

(Dec.

1999);

Smith

wholesal[e],

cost,

Wholesale Co. v. R.J. Reynolds

discount,

Tobacco Co. (Feb. 2007); Hoover

discrimen[ate],

Color Corp. v. Bayer Corp. (July

market,

purchas[e],

1998); Boise Cascade Corp. v. FTC

product,

(Jan. 1988); Lewis v. Philip Morris

case,
competitor,

Inc. (Jan. 2004)

evid[ence],

patman,

robinson
17 (3.7%)

bank,

unit,

state,

U.S. v. Connecticut Nat’l Bank

market, compani[es],

(June 1973); U.S. v. Philipsburg

merger, corpor[ation],

Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. (Oct. 1969);

effect,

U.S. v. First Nat’l Bank (June 1969);

area,

busi[ness], case, loan,

U.S.

v.

First

Nat’l

Bank

of

may, nation

Maryland (Jan. 1970); U.S. v.
Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co.
(Mar. 1965)

1 (3.2%)

class, price, member,

In re Processed Egg Products

purchas[e],

Antitrust Litig. (11/2015); In re

certify[ication], claim,

Titanium Dioxide Antitrust Litig.

common, milk, nfo,

(8/12);

rule, action, antitrust,

Products Antitrust Litig. (11/15);

damag[es]

In re Cathode Ray Tube (CRT)

In

re

Processed

Egg

Antitrust Litig. (7/15); In re
Graphics

Processing

Units

Antitrust Litig. (7/08)
24 (3.0%)

cabl[e],

servic[e],

commiss[ion],

Time Warner Entertainment Co. v.
U.S.

(May

2000);

Turner

broadcast,

fcc,

Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC

oper[ate],

program,

(June 1994); Turner Broadcasting

commun[ication],

System, Inc. v. FCC (Mar. 1997);

local,

market,

Turner Broadcasting System, Inc.

provid[er],

station,
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compani[es], interest,

v. FCC (Apr. 1993); Cincinnati Bell

must,

Tellephone Co. v. FCC (Nov. 1995)

public,

regul[ate],

state,

televis[ion]
4 (3.0%)

market,

card,

visa,

rule,

U.S. v. Visa U.S.A. Inc. (10/01);

agreement,

U.S. v. Visa U.S.A. Inc. (9/03); In

compet[ition],

re ATM Fee Anttrust Litig. (3/08);

restraint, effect, fee,

Affinion Benefits Group, LLC v.

per, reason, analysi[s],

Econ-O-Check Corp (3/11); U.S. v.

associ[ation],

American Express Co. (Sept. 2016)

case,

bank,
member,

merchant
16 (3.0%)

patent,

claim,

Semiconductor Energy Lab. Co. v.

licens[e],

Chi Mei Optoelectronics Corp.

use, inc, applic[ation],

(June 2007); Engel Indus., Inc. v.

cir,

issu[e],

Lockformer

Co.

devic[e],

Engineered

Products

infring[e],
invent,

said,

art,

(Sept.

1996);
Co.

v.

evid[ence], fed[eral],

Donaldson Co. (Apr. 2004); VAE

justment,

mean,

Nortrak North America, Inc. V.

motion,

prior,

Progress Rail Services Corp. (Oct.

product, royalti[es]

2006); Nystrom v. Trex Co. (June
2004)

Antitrust–Regulation Corpus
Topic

Top Terms

Top Decisions

Number/
Proportion
of Corpus
9 (8.9%)

state,

antitrust,

Snake River Valley Elec. Ass’n v.

action,

PacifiCorp. (Oct. 2000); Town of

citi[es],
immun[e/ity],

Hallie v. City of Eau Claire (Feb.

author[ity],

1983); Town of Hallie v. City of

competit[ion], power,

Eau Claire (Mar. 1985); Bright v.

activ[ity],

Ogden

law,

conduct,
Sherman,

alleg[ation],
municip[ality],
privat[e]

case,

City

Independent

(Dec.
Taxicab

1985);
Drivers’

Employees v. Greater Houston
Transportation Co. (May 1985)
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12 (7.6%)

commiss[ion],
carrier,

order,

rate,

American Trucking Ass’n v. ICC

file,

(Sept. 1981); Brizendine v. Cotter

power,

(Aug. 1993); Security Services, Inc.

regul[ate/ation/ator],

v.

agreement,

Southern Motor Carriers Rate

author[ity],
contract,
requir[e],

Corp.

(May

1994);

case,

Conference v. U.S. (Oct. 1985);

reason,

American Short Line Railroad v.

rule,

section,

Kmart

U.S. (Dec. 1984)

tariff,

transport
19 (6.8%)

claim,

alleg[ation],

complaint,

Caraang v. PNC Mortgage (June

dismiss,

2011); Sonterra Capital Master

motion, state, action,

Fund Ltd. v. Credit Suisse Group

cir, inc, violat[e/ion],

AG (Sept. 2017); Mincey v. World

antitrust,

requir[e],

Savings Bank (Aug. 2008); Young

amend,

v. Wells Fargo & Co. (Oct. 2009); In

rule,

also,

argu[ment/e],

re Packaged Seafood Products

conduct,

Antitrust Litig. (Mar. 2017)

contract,

count, fact, fail, fraud,
injuri[es], must, plead
24 (6.2%)

state, feder[al], claim,

Hillis Motors, Inc. v. Hawaii

action, jurisdict[ion],

Automobile Dealers’ Ass’n (June

case, right, cir, appeal,

1993);

dismiss,

Mining, Inc. (Oct. 1987); Florida

issu[e],

properti[es],
provid[e],
author,

Haydo

v.

Amerikohl

Agency for Health Care Admin. v.
amend,

Bayou Shores SNF, LLC (July

court,

2016); Florida Agency for Health

decis[ion],

Care Admin. v. Bayou Shores

determin[e],

SNF, LLC (In re Bayou Shores

govern[ment], grant,

SNF, LLC) (July 2016); McGuire v.

judgment,

U.S. (Feb. 2013)

motion,

order
23 (5.9%)

price,

evid[ence],

Package Shop, Inc. v. Anheuser-

product, market, sale,

Busch, Inc. (Oct. 1987); Pearl

competit[ion],

Brewing Co. v. Anheuser-Busch,

conspiraci[es],
dealer,

case,

Inc. (Feb. 1972); J.F. Feeser, Inc. v.

distributor,

Serv-A-Portion, Inc. (Aug. 1990);
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retail,

agreement,

67

Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita

alleg[e/ation],

Elec. Indus. Co. (Mar. 1981);

busi[ness], fact, inc,

Beermart, Inc. v. Stroh Brewery

manufactur[e/er],

Co. (Apr. 1986)

may, purchas[e]
8 (5.8%)

20 (5.6%)

state, unit, congress,

K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc. (May

statut[e], case, section,

1988); Hart v. U.S. (Oct. 1978);

legisl[ation],

Coalition to Preserve the Integrity

govern[ment],

of American Trademarks v. U.S.

regul[ation],

(May 1986); U.S. v. Mersey (Feb.

author[ity], feder[al],

1960); Vivitar Corp. v. U.S. (Aug.

foreign, gener

1984)

agenc[y/ies],
rule,

order,

Deering Milliken, Inc. v. FTC (July

inform,

1978); Shell Oil Co. v. DOE (Aug.

regul[ation/ator/ate],

1979);

requir[e],

Patterns Report Litig. (Apr. 1977);

govern[ment], issu[e],

Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of

proceed,

Pittsburgh v. Midland Bancor, Inc.

review,

In

re

FTC

Corporate

administr[ative/ator],

(Dec.

applic[ation],

Richfield Co. July 1977)

case,

1994);

FTC

v.

Atlantic

decis[ion]
1 (4.6%)

state, commerc[e/ial],

Environmental Tech. Council v.

regul[ation/ator/ate],

Sierra Club (Oct. 1996); Tocher v.

interest,

claus[e],

City of Santa Ana (July 2000); Ben

feder[al],

statut[e],

Oehrleins & Sons & Daughter, Inc.

author[ity],

v. Hennepin County (June 1997);

citi[es], congress, local

CSX Transportation, Inc. v. City of

wast,

Plymouth (Apr. 2000); Stucky v.
City of San Antonio (July 2001)
4 (4.6%)

patent,

antitrust,

Valley

Drug

Co.

v.

Geneva

damag[es],

Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (Sept. 2003);

juri[es/sdiction],

In re Terazosin Hydrochloride

claim, gener, trial, cir,

Antitrust Litig. (Aug. 2004); In re

district,

Yarn Process Patent Validity &

agreement,

inc, judgment, use,

Anti-Trust

action,

Kearney &

corp,

Litig.

(Apr.

Trecker

1974);

Corp.

v.

Cincinnati Milacron, Inc. (Oct.
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evid[ence],

1975);

In

re

infring[e/ement]

Hydrochloride

Terazosin

Antitrust

Litig.

(Jan. 2005)
10 (4.5%)

market,

claim,

AD/SAT, Div. of Skylight, Inc. v.

competit[ion],

Associated

antitrust, evid[ence],

Hendricks Music co. v. Steinway,

product,

relev[ant],

Inc. (June 1988); AD/SAT v.

servic[e],

inc,

Associated Pres (Feb. 1996); Allen-

monopol[y], power

Press

(June

1999);

Myland, Inc. v. IBM Corp. (July
1988); Creative Copier Services v.
Xerox Corp. (Feb. 2000)

14 (4.3%)

25 (3.8%)

amend,

state,

first,

Kimberlin v. Quinlan (Oct. 1993);

regul[ation/ator/ate],

Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v.

speech,

cir,

FEC (Aug. 2009); Kiser v. Kamdar

claim, govern[ment],

(Aug. 2016); O Centro Espirita

interest, protect, right,

Beneficiente Uniao Do Vegetal v.

also, constitut[e/ion]

Ashcroft (Nov. 2004)

secur[ity/ities],

Koppers Co. v. American Express

case,

exchang[e],
bank,

stock,

Co. (Apr. 1988); Revlon, Inc. v.

compani[es],

Pantry Pride, Inc. (Sept. 1985);

corpor[ate/ation],

Stonehill v. Security Nat’l Bank

offer,

(June

issu[e],

loan,

1975);

SEC

v.

Falstaff

rule, sec, share, action,

Brewing Corp. (May 1980); U.S. v.

busi[ness],

Morgan (Oct. 1953)

interest, invest

case,

